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A few developed countries have secretly initiated and negotiated the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  The ACTA is aimed at 
enhancing international copyright and trademark enforcement measures.  
This Article analyses the copyright dimension of ACTA, considering its 
various provisions and the rationale behind them.  The Article does so by 
thoroughly examining the complex intersection of intellectual property law 
and criminal law.  The Article then draws a few major conclusions and 
makes contributions to the area of copyright law: it shows how the ACTA in 
fact merely mimics the U.S. approach towards criminal enforcement of 
copyright law.  Second, and more importantly, it illustrates how the ACTA 
initiative is therefore flawed in light of the U.S. experience to date with 
criminal enforcement of copyright law.  Lastly, the Article makes a 
normative contribution by suggesting a better, education-based approach 
concerning criminal enforcement of copyright law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The enforcement of intellectual property law is a continuing, ever-
growing, and challenging task for countries around the world.  In response 
to the challenges faced, enforcement issues have arisen at both the national 
and international levels.  International agreements have been introduced 
over the years in order to advance minimum international standards that 
will assist national governments, inter alia, in combating widespread 
infringement. 
As part of this “war” against intellectual property infringement, 
criminal sanctions have gained in prevalence.  Despite the efforts made, it is 
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indisputable that counterfeiting rates have continuously grown in recent 
years, thereby suggesting that the criminal enforcement systems in place 
have not significantly deterred or affected people’s behavior in this field.  
Counterfeiting today is a $600 billion industry worldwide and accounts for 
5%–7% of global trade.
1
  It is estimated that in the United States alone, 
counterfeiting accounts for over $200 billion annually.
2
  In the last two 
decades, counterfeiting has increased by more than 10,000%.
3
 
As exemplified by the statistics, counterfeiting in today’s globalized 
environment is a global problem that can only be combated on an 
international scale.  In response to this need for anti-counterfeiting 
enforcement, a group of developed countries collaborated to negotiate and 
form the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
4
 an initiative to 
increase enforcement of intellectual property rights and combat 
counterfeiting beyond the existing enforcement provisions of the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS).
5
 
Through the ACTA, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and the 
European Communities have initiated a move towards heightened 
intellectual property rights enforcement.
6
  These nations officially 
announced their intention to start negotiations for the ACTA in 2007.
7
  




1 About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL., http://www.iacc.org/about-
counterfeiting (last visited July 17, 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. (“Since 1982, the global trade in illegitimate goods has increased from $5.5 billion 
to approximately $600 billion annually.”). 
4 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), opened for signature May 1, 2011, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 
28, 2011) [hereinafter ACTA].  As of October 1, 2011, eight of the eleven negotiating parties 
had signed the Agreement, with the remaining three confirming their intent to sign.  The 
Agreement will enter into force once six of these signatories have deposited their formal 
instrument of ratification.  OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/
acta (last visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
6 Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 992 
(2011) (“[A]ll the key ACTA negotiating parties . . . had at one time or another submitted 
their own papers on enforcement to the Council.”).  The participating parties are Australia, 
Canada, the European Union (as well as each of its member states), Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States.  OFF. OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
7 Yu, supra note 6, at n.55–59. 
8 Joel Rose, Secrecy Around Trade Agreement Causes Stir, NPR (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124780647&ft=1&f=1003 (“[It] feels 
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Yet criticism of the secretive negotiations diminished when the negotiating 
parties released a draft of the proposed agreement in April 2010 and a final 
draft in October of the same year.
9




The ACTA represents the strongest intellectual property enforcement 
agreement to date negotiated at the international level.  The goals of the 
ACTA include: “(1) strengthening international cooperation, (2) improving 
enforcement practices, and (3) providing a strong legal framework for 
[intellectual property rights] enforcement.”
11
  It does so by bringing about 
the following changes to TRIPS’s existing policies and goals: 
(1) [E]xpansive coverage of multiple kinds of IP and changes to the international 
definitions used in the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Law (TRIPS Agreement); (2) the expansion of what constitutes criminal 
copyright violations; (3) more stringent border measures; (4) mandating closer 
cooperation between governments and rights holders . . . ; and (5) the creation of a 
new international institution (an ACTA “Committee”) to address IP enforcement.
12
 
This Article explores the ACTA’s criminal provisions pertaining to 
copyright law.  The ACTA, described as a TRIPS-plus agreement, includes 
several provisions concerning the criminal enforcement of copyright law 
that have never before been included in an international agreement.  Most 
notably, the ACTA calls for strong penalties on the books: “[E]ach Party 
shall provide penalties that include imprisonment as well as monetary fines 
sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future acts of infringement . . . .”
13
  
The tougher penalties apply to several acts of intellectual property 
infringement.  Under the criminal enforcement provision, criminal 
sanctions apply to willful trademark counterfeiting, copyright piracy, or 
“willful importation and domestic use” of counterfeit labels and packaging 
 
that you’re almost in a bit of a twilight zone . . . .  I mean, we’re talking about a copyright 
treaty.  And it’s being treated as akin to nuclear secrets.” (quoting Michael Geist, Faculty of 
Law, University of Ottawa)). 
9 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2011). 
10 See ACTA, supra note 4. 
11 Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes, 
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-
announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Ambassador Schwab]. 
12 Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385, 387–88 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
13 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 24 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Conversely, TRIPS 
does not require imprisonment and monetary fines.  Instead, TRIPS only requires that 
member states provide for imprisonment or fines.  See TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 61, at 105. 
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in the course of trade on a commercial scale.
14
  In addition, the ACTA 
demands that criminal penalties apply to the act of aiding and abetting 
criminal conduct and requires the criminalization of camcording movies in 
theaters.
15
  Perhaps the most controversial provision
16
 involves the 
criminalization of copyright infringement that takes place on the internet.
17
  
Finally, the ACTA requires that its member states establish anti-
circumvention laws to protect the use of online technological protection 
measures,
18




Although not yet enacted, the ACTA has already been subject to sharp 
criticisms from non-member states and even member states’ domestic 
citizens for its aggressive approach towards intellectual property 
enforcement as well as its procedural pitfalls.
20
  Moreover, the following 
four main criticisms have been presented concerning the ACTA’s 
negotiations: the lack of transparency and secrecy in the negotiating 
process, the limited number of negotiating participants, the undemocratic 
 
14 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 23, paras. 1–2. 
15 Id. paras. 3–4; see also Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of 
American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 709, 750 (2010) (reporting that Pennsylvania residents participating in a 
survey rated the severity of a repeat offender’s camcording as equivalent to that of a second-
degree misdemeanor with an appropriate punishment of a fine between $50 and $200; 
current law classifies that conduct as a third-degree felony punishable by up to seven years 
in prison). 
16 The digital crime provision has become controversial because many critics believe it 
will infringe upon the fundamental right of freedom of expression.  See John R. Crook, U.S. 
Trade Representative Releases Text of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement; Critics and 
Supporters Debate Agreement, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 137, 138 (2011). 
17 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27.  TRIPS does not provide for any enforcement against 
copyright infringement online.  See TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 61, at 105. 
18 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 5. 
19 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
20 See, e.g., Robin Gross, IP Justice White Paper on the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA), IP JUST., 4–6 (Mar. 25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf; Dunne: What Are We Signing 
Up To, Mr. Power?, UNITED FUTURE (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.unitedfuture.org.nz/dunne-
what-are-we-signing-up-to-mr-power/ (discussing protests in New Zealand); Michael Geist, 
Government Should Lift Veil on ACTA Secrecy, MICHAEL GEIST (June 9, 2008), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3013/135/; Vanessa Gera, Poland Signs Copyright 
Treaty that Drew Protests, YAHOO! (Jan. 27, 2012), http://sg.news.yahoo.com/poland-signs-
copyright-treaty-drew-protests-102302237.html (discussing the Polish parliament debates 
regarding ACTA). 
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process, and the lack of accountability.
21
 
This Article questions the wisdom of the ACTA’s criminal copyright 
infringement provisions, exploring whether the measures can in fact bring 
about better protection of intellectual property rights through stricter 
enforcement, given the American experience with similar measures.  This 
analysis reveals that the ACTA will not be able to achieve its objectives 
because of its problematic design, which is quite similar to the problematic 
design of the U.S. law. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II will generally discuss the 
intersection of criminal law and intellectual property law, touching upon the 
complexities surrounding the criminalization of intellectual property 
infringement.  Part III will then turn to the specific branch of copyright law, 
examining its intersection with criminal law.  Part IV will outline the 
development of criminal copyright infringement provisions and discuss the 
reasons for the criminalization of copyright law.  In Part V, the effects of 
these criminal sanctions will be examined and their futility shown.  Part VI 
will then turn to examine the international dimension of copyright 
enforcement, discussing the developments of criminal provisions under 
international intellectual property law from the adoption of the Berne 
Convention through the ACTA and describing the key changes introduced 
by ACTA from TRIPS.  This Part will also discuss ACTA’s proposed 
copyright enforcement measures, demonstrate their drawbacks given the 
American experience, and propose a different approach to enforcement 
challenges—mainly relying on educational campaigns as a tool for bringing 
about a real change. 
II. THE INTERSECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 
Criminal law has been embedding itself into intellectual property law 
enforcement at a rapid pace.
22
  Given the increasing value of intellectual 
 
21 Geist, supra note 20; Gross, supra note 20, at 4–6. 
22 Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations 
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 167, 235–36 (2002) (“Probably no area of criminal law has experienced more growth in 
recent years than intellectual property, at least in terms of legislative enactments.  In the last 
two decades alone, Congress has criminalized both trademark infringement and theft of trade 
secrets; broadened the scope of criminal liability for copyright infringement; imposed 
criminal liability for the manufacture and sale of devices that can be used to circumvent 
technological protection measures; and made trademark counterfeiting, theft of trade secrets, 
and copyright violation predicate acts under both the money laundering and RICO statutes.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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properties to the U.S. economy,
23
 the attempt to use criminal sanctions to 
protect intellectual property rights comes as no surprise.  However, because 
of the unique characteristics of intellectual properties—intangibility, non-
excludability, and non-rivalry—the application of criminal law to this 
domain has met much difficulty and opposition. 
A. THE COMPLEXITIES SURROUNDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT 
Should intellectual property infringement be criminalized?  That is, 
should criminal sanctions come in place of civil sanctions, in addition to 
them, or not at all?  While the existing theoretical discussion on this 
question is sparse, various legal commentaries have addressed the general 
justifications for and against criminalizing intellectual property law. 
Intellectual property crimes usually do not involve violence.
24
  The 
harm they cause is often difficult to assess,
25
 and the victims of the crimes 
are not easily identifiable.
26
  The question of who should be held culpable 
for the offense is also not easily answered.
27
  Moreover, some intellectual 
property offenses “are committed in the course of conduct that is otherwise 
legal, and even socially productive.”
28
  These factors have led one scholar 
to denominate intellectual property offenses as “morally ambiguous.”
29
  
This uncertainty causes people to question whether such offenses are 
morally wrong in the first place and consequently whether they are 
deserving of criminal sanctions.
30
  Stuart Green notes that another 
ambiguity in the intersection between criminal law and intellectual property 
law comes from their incompatible paradigms: criminal law relies on the 
 
23 See EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 1 (3d ed. 2006) (“[I]n 2005 the overall value of the 
‘intellectual capital’ of U.S. businesses—including copyrights, trademarks, patents, and 
related information assets—was estimated to account for a third of the value of U.S. 
companies, or about $5 trillion.”), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/
ipma2006.pdf. 
24 Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property 
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 475 (2011). 
25 Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2004) (discussing white-collar crimes generally and the 
difficulties of identifying their respective harms and victims). 
26 Id. at 509. 
27 Id. at 510. 
28 Id. at 513. 
29 Id. at 502–03. 
30 Id. at 508–10. 




 while intellectual property relies on the paradigms of 
infringement, false marking, counterfeiting, and regulatory violations.
32
  
Each paradigm is based on different moral and doctrinal foundations, and 
the lack of coherence as to why each paradigm is applied further intensifies 
the moral ambiguity in criminalizing intellectual property violations.
33
 
However, the fact that intellectual property crimes may at times be 
morally ambiguous does not necessarily mean that criminal law should not 
be applied to such crimes.  Rather, the use of criminal law has to take a 
nuanced approach in which the moral ambiguity surrounding certain 
infringing conduct is acknowledged.
34
  As Green states, “our system is 
committed to the notion that only the most clearly harmful and wrongful 
kinds of conduct should be treated with criminal sanctions,” and thus he 
cautions against the indiscriminate use of sanctions.
35
  Moreover, he warns 
that, if the ambiguity prevails, “the moral authority of the criminal law will 
itself be viewed as ambiguous.”
36
 
B. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
If intellectual property is protected like tangible property, then one can 
 
31 Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations 
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 167, 240–41 (2002). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 241 (“Despite the significance—both moral and doctrinal—of such paradigms, it 
is often difficult to determine why Congress chose to use one rather than another.  From the 
perspective of intellectual property law, to refer to what are essentially copyright or patent 
violations as ‘theft’ may seem inconsistent with the idea of ‘infringement’ and ‘false 
marking’ as sui generis.  From the perspective of criminal law, moreover, words like ‘theft’ 
and ‘stealing’ have particular expressive and moral resonances that are unlikely to find easy 
equivalence in the law of intellectual property.” (footnote omitted)); see also Grace Pyun, 
The 2008 Pro-IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in Criminal Intellectual 
Property Law and its Effect on Prosecutorial Boundaries, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 379–85 (2009) (discussing how the PRO-IP Act justifies the 
criminalization of IP offenses through the use of the property paradigm and outlining why 
the use of the paradigm is unjustified given the differences between property and IP). 
34 Green, supra note 25, at 518–19 (suggesting several possibilities by which ambiguity 
could be reduced; these include defining the damages caused by IP offenses and more clearly 
delineating who is harmed by IP offenses). 
35 Id.; see also Manta, supra note 24, at 476 (“Penal statutes must proscribe a nontrivial 
harm or evil; hardship and stigma may be imposed only for conduct that is in some sense 
wrongful; violations of criminal laws must result in punishments that are deserved; and the 
burden of proof should be placed on those who advocate the imposition of criminal 
sanctions.” (quoting DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 103 (2008))). 
36 Green, supra note 25, at 518. 
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argue that infringements of intellectual property rights should be punished 
as deprivations of tangible property.
37
  Irina Manta notes that there are 
similarities between the harms caused by intellectual property infringement 
and the harms caused in property crimes.
38
  For example, as with property 
crimes, an infringer can reduce the economic value of a good.
39
  In addition, 
just as infringement can reduce the incentive to develop intellectual 
property goods, so too does property crime hinder “various productive 
endeavors” using tangible property.
40
  Nevertheless, she points out that 
intellectual property violations more often occur accidentally and may 
consequently be less wrongful than property violations.
41
 
Because intellectual property is such an important part of the United 
States’ economy and because civil remedies do not sufficiently deter the 
violations, some legal commentaries have emphasized the importance of 
transitioning from civil remedies to criminal penalties.
42
  According to the 
Department of Justice’s intellectual property prosecution manual, “criminal 
sanctions are often warranted to punish and deter the most egregious 
violators: repeat and large-scale offenders, organized crime groups, and 
those whose criminal conduct threatens public health and safety.”
43
  Along 
this line of thinking, Maureen Walterbach advocates for a more targeted 
approach laying down tougher sanctions (usually criminal ones) when 
dealing with intellectual property crimes committed by organized crime 
groups.
44
  Given the danger such groups pose to society, and the scale to 
which intellectual property crimes have grown, the author argues that the 
problems posed by both trends separately will only be exacerbated when 




37 See Manta, supra note 24, at 475–77 (delineating how economic harm committed to 
property gives rise to the imposition of sanctions and stating that, at times, economic harm is 
not even needed for the sanctions to be imposed). 
38 Id. at 473–80. 
39 Id. at 479. 
40 Id. at 479–80. 
41 Id. at 480. 
42 See, e.g., John R. Grimm, Stephen F. Guzzi & Kathleen Elizabeth Rupp, Intellectual 
Property Crimes, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 741, 743 (2010) (“The marked increase in 
intellectual property theft, combined with the ineffective deterrence provided by civil 
remedies, has led the federal as well as state and local governments to enact criminal statutes 
to protect intellectual property.”). 
43 EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
44 Maureen Walterbach, Note, International Illicit Convergence: The Growing Problem 
of Transnational Organized Crime Groups’ Involvement in Intellectual Property Rights 
Violations, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (2007). 
45 Id. at 596–97. 
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C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST APPLYING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
Intellectual property infringement is widespread, rampant, and can be 
committed on a grand scale thanks to technological advances.  However, 
some legal scholars have criticized the justification for implementing 
criminal sanctions in this context.
46
  Although civil remedies may not deter 
such violations, this can be attributed to the fact that a large percentage of 
the population does not view many intellectual property crimes as morally 
wrong.  In order for a law to be effective, people must believe that there is a 
justified moral premise standing behind it and that the law is legitimate in 
terms of the trustworthiness of the institution that created it.
47
  “Thus, the 
vast majority of people refrain from committing criminal acts such as 
murder, rape, and even theft not because they fear sanctions if caught, but 
because they have internalized the norms against such acts.”
48
  According to 
Green, compliance with intellectual property laws will not occur if punitive 
criminal sanctions alone are instated.  Rather, the public needs to be 
persuaded that violating intellectual property laws “is morally wrong (if in 




Other objectors to the use of criminal law in enforcing intellectual 
property rights argue that increased protections tend to limit the expansion 
of the public domain, and the First Amendment right of free speech is 
impeded by overbroad intellectual property protections.
50
 
Further, Geraldine Moohr cautions against using criminal sanctions 
 
46 E.g., Green, supra note 31, at 235–37. 
47 Id. at 237–38 (citing Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A 
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 225 (1996–1997)). 
48 Id. at 238; see also Pyun, supra note 33, at 391 (“[I]t is difficult to impose upon 
society the view that IP offenses are immoral unless society thinks that the offense is 
harmful to begin with.”). 
49 Green, supra note 31, at 239; see also Pyun, supra note 33, at 393–94 (“In order for 
the government to create a meaningful progress in the long term effectiveness of criminal IP 
laws and to establish a more balanced policy of IP owner rights and public access, the DOJ 
needs to implement the law that targets the behavior and not the property.  The key is to set 
clearer boundaries between civil and criminal IP sections and the DOJ must be clear to limit 
its role in the criminal realm.”). 
50 Pyun, supra note 33, at 594–95; see also Lucille M. Ponte, Coming Attractions: 
Opportunities and Challenges in Thwarting Global Movie Piracy, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 331, 335 
(2008) (“Furthermore, First Amendment advocates are concerned that the further 
criminalization of copyright violations places a chilling effect on free speech and continues 
to dismantle fair use principles in this march toward zero tolerance against movie copyright 
violations.”). 
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before the effectiveness of civil sanctions is thoroughly examined.
51
  She 
asserts that criminal sanctions deter “legitimate conduct” more than civil 
sanctions do.
52
  Moreover, 
[t]he record of economic growth indicates that civil remedies appear to motivate 
adequately the creation of new products, while not over-compensating in a way that 
inhibits long-term innovation and economic growth.  Civil remedies more effectively 
address the real harm that results when an information product is taken: the loss of 
value to its holder.
53
 
III. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
The justifications for the use of criminal law vary from one branch of 
intellectual property law to another because of the differing rationales at the 




The increasing infringement of copyrighted products (such as music, 
DVDs, and business software) has been met with increasingly stringent 
criminal penalties globally and in the U.S.
55
  While the reasons for 
criminalizing copyright infringement lean towards protecting “financial 
stability, employment, and creative innovation,”
56
 the trend toward 
 
51 Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of 
Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 918 (2002). 
52 Id. at 919. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (pointing out that the lessons learned from legislation criminalizing violations of 
trade secret law will not necessarily apply to patent law and copyright law); Manta, supra 
note 24, at 500–05 (describing the differences between patents and soft intellectual property; 
this difference can explain why patent law has not been criminalized); Pyun, supra note 33, 
at 357 (noting that trademark and copyright law “are rooted in different purposes and the 
legislation behind each used different justifications and policy considerations.  The question 
arises whether such consolidation of IP criminal penalties are appropriate in light of this 
history.”); Alex Steel, Problematic and Unnecessary? Issues with the Use of the Theft 
Offence to Protect Intangible Property, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 575, 599 (“Intellectual property 
rights share many common characteristics, but being largely creatures of statute, they also 
are significantly different in important respects.  It is therefore difficult to discuss intellectual 
property generally.”). 
55 For a list of laws criminalizing copyright infringement, see infra Part IV.  See also 
Michael M. DuBose, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws in the Twenty-
First Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481, 484, 486–89 (2006) (describing the low risks, 
low costs, and high commercial value associated with pirated DVDs and software and the 
need to combat such piracy through updated criminal laws). 
56 Robin Andrews, Note, Copyright Infringement and the Internet: An Economic 
Analysis of Crime, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 256 (2005) (citing Karen J. Bernstein, 
Note, Net Zero: The Evisceration of the Sentencing Guidelines Under the No Electronic 
Theft Act, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 57, 59–62 (2001)). 
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criminalizing infringement has not escaped critical review.  This Section 
will provide an overview of the specific issues at the heart of the juncture of 
criminal law and copyright law.
57
 
A. MORAL WRONGNESS AND HARM 
What are the primary rationales that exist for applying criminal law in 
the first place?  According to one analysis, conduct must be morally wrong, 
or harmful, or both in order to justify the use of criminal sanctions.
58
  
However, the question of what constitutes moral wrongness or harm is not 
clearly answerable with respect to copyright infringement.  In terms of 
morality, Geraldine Moohr explains that the “source of that dimension is 
unclear; it may rest on community norms or on principles derived from 
conceptions of what is right and good.”
59
  Moohr also delineates three 
limitations governing the identification of harms that justify the use of 
criminal sanctions.
60
  First, the use of criminal sanctions in order to deter 
harm must only occur after all other options have been exhausted.
61
  
Second, the harmful conduct must also harm a broader societal interest 
besides that of the individual.
62
  Third, criminal sanctions should not be 
instituted if the cost of doing so is greater than the benefit derived.
63
  In a 
somewhat similar vein, Joel Feinberg justifies criminal sanctions for actions 
that would cause considerable harm, given the “magnitude of the harm, 





57 It is important to note that criminal copyright provisions address commercial copyright 
infringement and personal use infringement.  Commercial copyright infringement involves 
infringement for the purpose of competing with the copyright owner for profits.  Personal 
use infringement consists of infringement that is not for profit.  The issues that arise from 
criminalizing copyright law primarily relate to the increasing criminalization of personal use 
infringement.  See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735–38 (2003) 
(describing the history of the criminalization of copyright law and the difference between 
competitive infringement and non-commercial infringement). 
58 Id. at 747–52. 
59 Id. at 749. 
60 Id. at 752–53. 
61 Id. at 752. 
62 Id. at 752–53. 
63 Id. at 753. 
64 Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between 
Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 228 (2006). 
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1. Morality and Social Norms 
With regard to the morality considerations behind criminal law, Moohr 
argues that stealing property and infringing a copyright do not reside on the 
same moral plane and therefore require different treatment under criminal 
law.
65
  Moreover, the fact that a substantial segment of society does not 
view infringement as morally wrong
66




From a behavioral economics perspective, Robin Andrews warns that 
when people see that many of their peers are committing infringing acts 
without being punished and that the pervading social norm is that such 
infringement is not morally wrong, they will be less likely to obey the 
law.
68
  Consequently, the law will have the opposite effect of what it was 
intended to accomplish.
69
  He directs the focus of legislators towards 
creating policies that tackle the gap between legal prohibitions and societal 
norms.
70
  Similarly, Mark Schultz suggests that people need to be 
convinced that abiding by the law is the “right thing to do.”
71
  However, 
changing the social norms that embrace infringement activities is not a 
simple endeavor.  “Norms likely arise from a variety of sources, including 
religion, philosophy, culture, education, and biology.  There is likely no 
universal or easy way to establish a social norm.”
72
  More importantly, 
 
65 Moohr, supra note 57, at 765–66. 
66 Moohr attributes this to the existence of a social norm that supports the free use of 
information and to consumer confusion stemming from the difficulty in differentiating 
between criminal infringement and legal conduct.  Id. at 767–73. 
67 Id. at 773–74. 
68 Andrews, supra note 56, at 278–81; see also Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and 
Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright 
Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 662–63 (2006) (discussing how tough sanctions and a 
low probability of getting caught limit the effectiveness of deterrence-based strategies). 
69 Andrews, supra note 56, at 279–80. 
70 See id. at 280 (suggesting that society’s conception of IP rights needs to be aligned 
with its conception of property and personality rights); see also Ben Depoorter & Sven 
Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 
1127, 1175 (2005) (“Policymakers should take note of the pervasiveness of the anticopyright 
norms of experienced file sharers when considering recent proposals to criminalize 
noncommercial copyright infringements . . . .  In a regime of severe sanctions, users of file-
sharing technology become more anticopyright and resort to more downloading whenever 
enforcement is temporarily suspended.  Such norm effects are particularly relevant in the 
context of copyright law because technological changes and copyright-circumvention 
technology inevitably create lapses in copyright enforcement.” (footnote omitted)). 
71 Schultz, supra note 68, at 665. 
72 Id. at 667–68 (footnote omitted) (citing Richard McAdams & Eric B. Rasmussen, 
Norms in Law and Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell 
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attempting to change social norms with tougher criminal penalties and 




Why do copyright infringement crimes appear to lack the moral 
wrongness that is needed for the proper application of criminal sanctions?  
One commentator has provided an interesting explanation by dividing 
infringers into three categories.
74
  The first category is those who infringe 
on a large scale in order to attain commercial gains from others’ works.
75
  
Society usually views these lawbreakers as deserving of punishment.
76
  The 
second category of infringers includes people who, with good intentions 
and no financial motive, infringe on a smaller scale in order to promote 
learning or creativity.
77
  These infringers are viewed as undeserving of 
punishment.
78
  Yet, the advent of technological advancements has resulted 
in a third category of infringers, “who have no particular profit motive, but 
who use the Internet to cause, or to avail themselves of, infringements 
multiplied on a huge scale.”
79
  While copyright owners are harmed by such 
infringers, the infringers themselves are not receiving any commercial gain, 




Moreover, Hardy also notes that the public’s conception of tangible 
property and intangible property is different, and this contributes to the 
 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2006)). 
73 See Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music 
Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO L.J. 733, 746–48 (2005) (describing the 
backlash that occurs when social norms do not correlate with criminal laws and noting that 
backlashes will occur when the law is used too forcefully in order to change those norms 
(citing Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1017 (1995))). 
74 I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 
326–32 (2002). 
75 Id. at 326–27. 
76 Id. at 327. 
77 Id. at 326. 
78 Id. at 327. 
79 Id. at 326. 
80 Id. at 328 (“Part of the public’s and the courts’ vexation with copyright law today 
stems from a new category of infringer, one that seems to fall half way between the good and 
the bad.  Examples these days are legion: the teenagers who make a sport of finding and 
publicizing ways to defeat copy-protection technologies; or the computer scientists who 
believe that the research ethic requires them to publish their findings of vulnerabilities in a 
commercial encryption technology; or the college students who accumulate a collection of 
MP3 music files for their own enjoyment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
80 MIRIAM BITTON [Vol. 102 
 
inconsistency between criminal copyright laws and social norms.
81
 
Nearly all of us, though, grow up from childhood with a heavy and inevitable 
exposure to the concept of tangible property, but an inevitably light exposure to 
concepts of intangible property like copyrights.  We are thus predisposed to find the 
rules of tangible property ownership to be appropriate and sensible, but not 
equivalently predisposed to find those of intangible property ownership the same.
82
 
Furthermore, the harm caused by copyright infringement is not always 
immediately felt.  Only multiple violations over the course of time add up 
to produce an “aggregate” harm.
83
  Hardy concludes that the public regards 
immediately felt harm more seriously than harm that accumulates in the 
long term, which is why infringement does not seem to be morally wrong.
84
  
Finally, “[i]ndifference to intellectual property rights may also arise from 
growing consumer expectations about receiving information and 




While one of the justifications for employing criminal law is the need 
to punish harmful conduct, oftentimes in copyright infringement cases the 
harm suffered by copyright owners has been exaggerated.
86
  For example, 
people who download music illegally are not necessarily those who would 
have purchased the music in the first place at the higher price.  
Consequently, including the “losses” stemming from their lack of purchases 
is inaccurate because it is unlikely that they would have purchased a CD in 
the first place.
87
  Furthermore, unlike shop owners who absorb a direct loss 
from the theft of a product that they had to purchase themselves, copyright 
 
81 See id. at 332–34. 
82 Id. at 341. 
83 Id. at 336–38. 
84 Id. at 334–39; see also Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 769 (2010) (explaining 
Beccaria’s position that punishments that are certain, severe enough to sufficiently offset the 
anticipated gains of crime, and arrive immediately after the crime would make for a more 
effective legal system than the system that existed at the time, which combined great cruelty 
and the seemingly random exercise of mercy (emphasis added)). 
85 Ponte, supra note 50, at 347. 
86 See Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal 
Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 426–31 (2003) (discussing the difficulty in 
measuring the loss suffered by copyright owners, which puts the use of excessive criminal 
penalties in question); Neri, supra note 73, at 741–42 (criticizing the music industry’s 
economic loss claims); Ponte, supra note 50, at 335 (questioning the economic loss claims 
made by the movie industry). 
87 Goldman, supra note 86, at 426–27. 
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owners do not suffer a similar loss when their products are illegally 
copied.
88
  Eric Goldman is critical of criminal copyright statutes whose 
“focus on technical, not substantive, harm puts otherwise socially-
permissible activities in jeopardy.”
89
  The question follows: If the harm 
caused is difficult to measure, should criminal sanctions instead of other 
remedies be used to rectify the harm?
90
 
According to Moohr, personal-use infringement does not meet the 
limitations governing the principle of harm.
91
  Measuring the harm that 
occurs through criminal copyright infringement is often difficult and the 
losses claimed by various copyright industries are oftentimes overstated.
92
  
In addition, she concludes that broader societal interests (such as 
copyright’s goal of promoting creation) are not harmed by infringement.
93
  
Moreover, socially valuable behavior associated with infringement may be 
chilled if criminal sanctions are introduced.
94
 
B. COPYRIGHT VS. PROPERTY 
Though some have compared copyright infringement to property theft 
and used this comparison as a justification for instituting criminal 
sanctions,
95
 the equivalence of rights in copyrighted works and rights in 
tangible property is questionable.
96
  In distinguishing copyright from 
tangible property, Lydia Loren notes that: 
One of the most salient aspects of copyright is that, unlike tangible property, the 
public’s interest is paramount, not the interests of the property owner, i.e., the 
 
88 Id. at 427–28. 
89 Id. at 428. 
90 Id. (“Because we cannot determine with precision when real loss occurs, at what point 
should loss suffered by a copyright owner be recognized as criminal harm?”). 
91 Moohr, supra note 57, at 753–57. 
92 Id. at 754–57. 
93 Id. at 757–64. 
94 Id. at 760–61 (“Economic studies show that consumers are often better innovators than 
original producers, largely because they use the products.  Yet the DMCA, and to a lesser 
extent the criminal infringement law, discourages consumers from tinkering with products, 
even those they own.  Treating code-breaking and unauthorized use as criminal may impede 
consumer innovation as it effectively bars entrants from new markets.”). 
95 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The 
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness 
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 852–53, 856–60 (1999) (noting “the increasingly 
prevalent view of copyrighted works as property just like jewelry, automobiles, and 
television sets” and examining the trend of treating copyright as property). 
96 See id. at 856–60 (describing the differences between property and copyright); Pyun, 
supra note 33, at 379–82 (describing the differences between IP and tangible property). 
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copyright owner . . . .  Copying a copyrighted work does not deprive the copyright 
owner of the use of that work.  Non-commercially motivated infringement may not 




Furthermore, applying the property paradigm to copyright law is 
complicated by the non-excludable nature of ideas and information.  The 
non-excludable aspect of intellectual property makes comparisons to 
tangible property less intuitive and, therefore, the application of severe 
criminal sanctions less appropriate.
98
 
C. COPYRIGHT POLICY 
Other commentators have asked whether criminalizing copyright law 
is compatible with the original purpose of copyright law and the 
Constitution.
99
  Noting that copyright law was intended to foster knowledge 
through the use of economic incentives
100
 (e.g., granting copyrights), they 
argue that criminalizing infringement only addresses one of the goals of 
copyright law (protecting the authors) at the expense of the other stated 
 
97 Loren, supra note 95, at 857, 859. 
98 See Neri, supra note 73, at 739–42 (“[L]aws protecting property are most necessary 
when the object of that law is scarce and cannot be shared without depriving the owner of it.  
In such a case, to exercise one basic property right—the right to possession, use, and 
enjoyment—one must to some extent exercise another—the right to exclude.  If an 
individual with a loaf of bread wants to use and enjoy that commodity, she must exclude or 
at least limit others from using and enjoying it.  But in the case of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ the 
owner of the song’s copyright may still exercise the basic property right to use and enjoy the 
song without exercising the right to exclude others.”). 
99 E.g., Diane L. Kilpatrick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law: Preventing a Clear Danger to 
the U.S. Economy or Clearly Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 117–18 (2005) (examining whether 18 U.S.C. § 2319 and 17 
U.S.C. § 506(a) are in line with the original goals of copyright law); Loren, supra note 95, at 
836 (“If copyright law is to continue to advance its constitutionally mandated goal, the 
balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the users of copyrighted 
works must not be weighted too heavily in favor of copyright owners.”); Morea, supra note 
64, at 227 (remarking that Congress’s propensity to overprotect copyright owners with 
criminal sanctions negates the Copyright and Patent Clause in the Constitution (citing Note, 
The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705, 
1722 (1999)). 
100 Neri, supra note 73, at 736–37 (discussing the constitutional provision that “grants 
Congress the power to legislate in the area of copyright in order to ‘promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts’.  In interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
its ‘primary objective . . . is not to reward the labor of authors,’ but to effect that progress.  
Conceived and interpreted in unmistakably utilitarian terms, the Copyright Clause has been 
consistently interpreted by the [sic] as protecting creators’ interests not in order to personally 
enrich those creators, but as a means to a public benefits end.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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purpose of copyright law, to advance creation and knowledge.
101
  Moreover, 
because the need for economic incentives to spur creative activity lies in 
question, further doubt is cast upon the rationale of criminalizing copyright 
laws in order to protect copyright owners.
102
 
D. CRIMINAL LAW, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND FAIR USE 
Criminalizing copyright law also implicates First Amendment rights.  
Heneghan notes that “First Amendment advocates are concerned that the 
further criminalization of copyright violations places a chilling effect on 
free speech and continues to dismantle fair use principles in this march 
toward zero tolerance against movie copyright violations.”
103
  Loren notes 
that Congress has instated copyright provisions with care to ensure public 
access to information as well as to promote free speech.
104
 
E. THE COSTS OF APPLYING CRIMINAL LAW 
Geraldine Moohr applies a cost–benefit analysis in order to determine 
whether criminal law and copyright law should intersect.
105
  Noting that 
infringement harms the copyright owner and “the national policy of 
encouraging creative effort,” she examines whether there is an educative 
benefit that can be realized from criminalizing infringement.
106
  There is an 
assumption that criminalizing a behavior signals to members of the public 
that they should avoid the behavior because it is morally wrong.  She 
concludes that any educative benefit from criminal provisions is liable to be 
offset by the existing social norms that hold information as free to use.  
Moohr then examines the costs of enlisting criminal law: 
Those costs include financial expenses that can be predicted and quantified as dollar 
amounts, such as the community’s costs of enforcement and incarceration.  Economic 
 
101 Kilpatrick-Lee, supra note 99, at 117–18 (explaining that copyright statutes should 
aim to protect the copyright owner but at the same time, should not only benefit the 
copyright owner); Moohr, supra note 57, at 761 (reiterating that copyright law is also 
intended to promote public access and not just to protect copyright owners). 
102 Moohr, supra note 57, at 758–59. 
103 Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness—Is Congress Making a 
Scarecrow of the Law?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 35–37 (2002) (discussing the relevance of 
fair use as a defense in regard to the NET Act); Loren, supra note 95, at 865–70 (describing 
why the fair use defense is limited under the NET Act due to the prohibition on non-
commercial infringement); Ponte, supra note 50, at 335. 
104 Loren, supra note 95, at 861. 
105 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783 (2005). 
106 Id. at 792–94, 797–99. 
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harm to families of the convicted and the value of the imprisoned felon’s lost income 
can also be estimated and should be included in the tally.
107
 
In addition, Moohr describes the non-monetary harm caused to copyright 
policy where excessive protection of copyright owners frustrates the other 
copyright policy of promoting public access in order to encourage creation 
and learning.
108
  Such overprotection may stymie creation.  Moreover, 
because personal-use infringement is not viewed as morally wrong, using 
criminal law to combat it may lower the public’s respect for criminal law 




In sum, the moral ambiguity of personal-use infringement and the 
obscure harm caused to copyright owners shake the pillars supporting the 
application of criminal law.  With social norms operating against criminal 
infringement provisions and no satisfactory correlation to be found between 
copyright infringement and property theft, legal commentators are left with 
ample theoretical content to debate.  Finally, the balance between copyright 
policies, fair use, and free speech rights is an issue that must be resolved in 
order to enable smooth passing in the intersection between copyright and 
criminal law. 
Viewed in this light, the next Part will explore the increasing 
criminalization of copyright infringement. 
IV. THE INCREASING CRIMINALIZATION OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: A 
U.S. CASE STUDY 
For over one hundred years, numerous criminal provisions have been 
passed by the U.S. Congress to address the various forms of copyright 
infringement.  The following Section will outline the historical progression 
of the U.S. legislation that has been criminalizing copyright infringement, 
as well as the reasons behind the recent enhancement of penalties.
110
 
The first criminal copyright provision was enacted in 1897,
111
 
stipulating that unlawful performances and representations of copyrighted 
dramatic and musical works were misdemeanors.
112
  However, in order to 
 
107 Id. at 801. 
108 Id. at 801–04. 
109 Id. at 804–05. 
110 See William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 508 (2001) (“American criminal law’s historical development has borne no relation to 
any plausible normative theory—unless ‘more’ counts as a normative theory.”). 
111 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. 
112 Id.; see also Lori A. Morea, supra note 64, at 209–10. 
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be held culpable, the infringement had to be “willful and for profit.”
113
  
Congress added criminal penalties because copyright holders had protested 
that people were unlawfully performing their works in locations that were 
difficult to detect and, as a result, their rights were unenforceable.
114
 
In 1909, criminal sanctions were extended to cover every type of 
copyrighted work.
115
  The 1909 Copyright Act “provided misdemeanor 
penalties of up to one year in jail or a fine between $100 and $1,000, or 
both, for ‘any person who willfully and for profit’ infringed upon a 
protected copyright.”
116
  Moreover, “aiding and abetting willful and for-
profit infringement” was also penalized with criminal sanctions.
117
  Thus, 
the 1909 Act was an attempt to reduce the number of unlawful performers 
and, if they could not be stopped, punish those who were assisting them.
118
 
Criminal provisions remained the same until the 1970s when 
additional protections were provided.  The Sound Recording Act of 1971 
awarded sound recordings copyright protection for the first time.
119
  In 
addition, the “Act criminalized willful, for-profit infringement of sound 
recordings in response to the belief that the exclusion of such recordings 
from criminal provisions in the 1909 Copyright Act had led to an estimated 
annual volume of record and tape piracy exceeding $100 million.”
120
  
Congress took additional steps in 1974 in order to have a greater deterrent 





113 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. 
114 I. Trotter Hardy, supra note 74, at 315 (citing Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings 
Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. and H. of Reps. on Pending Bills to Amend and 
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong. 24 (1908); H.R. REP. NO. 91-53, at 2 
(1894)). 
115 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; Lanier Saperstein, Comment,  
Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and Economic Rents: Applying the Rent Seeking Model to 
the Criminal Law Formulation Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1470, 1474–75 
(1997). 
116 Saperstein, supra note 115, at 1475. 
117 Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, supra note 
99, at 1707–08. 
118 Id. at 1707 (describing the attempt to punish “criminally liable theater managers and 
agents”). 
119 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391; Note, The 
Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, supra note 99, at 1707–08. 
120 Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, supra note 
99, at 1708 (citing Mary Jane Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright 
Felony Act, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 674 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971))). 
121 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1581, at 4 (1974)). 
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Because lost profits in the movie and sound recording industry were 
attributed to infringement, higher fines and penalties were introduced in the 
1976 Copyright Act.
122
  General fines were increased to $10,000, and the 
infringer of sound recordings or motion pictures could be fined up to 
$25,000.
123
  Moreover, repeat offenders were to be punished with even 
higher fines and longer jail sentences, thereby shifting infringement from a 
misdemeanor to a felony.
124
  The Act also “changed the wording of the 
mens rea requirement from ‘for profit’ to ‘for purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain.’  This change clarified that the 
defendant’s activities need be motivated only by the desire of financial 




During the years following the 1976 Act, the movie and sound 
recording industries persuaded Congress that sound recording, audiovisual, 
and motion picture infringement needed to be punished with felony 
provisions because “misdemeanor penalties did not deter large scale 
copyright pirates” and the Department of Justice was less likely to enforce a 
misdemeanor offense than it was a felony offense.
126
  Thus, in 1982 the 
statute was amended again.  Different categories of felonious acts were 
created and harsher fines and longer jail sentences were imposed for acts of 
infringement that had been previously categorized as misdemeanors.
127
 
The 1982 amendments did not protect the computer and software 
industries, to their chagrin.  The rapid growth in the software industry had 
been accompanied by a boom in large-scale piracy.
128
  The large losses in 
 
122 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); Note, The 
Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, supra note 99, at 1708–09 
(citing Saunders, supra note 120). 
123 Saperstein, supra note 115, at 1478. 
124 Pyun, supra note 33, at 360. 
125 Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement, supra note 99, at 1708. 
126 Loren, supra note 95, at 842–43. 
127 Morea, supra note 64, at 2011 (“In 1982, Congress amended the Copyright Act to 
allow for new maximum fines as high as $250,000 and possible imprisonment of five years 
in cases where the individual was involved in reproducing or distributing more than 1000 
copies of one or more copyrighted sound recordings, or more than sixty-five copies of one or 
more motion pictures or audiovisual works.  In addition, another category of felonies was 
established, which allowed for fines of up to $250,000 and a maximum of two years in 
prison for the reproduction or distribution of at least 100 copies in the same time period.  
These penalties were placed in a new section, 2319 of the United States Code, while the 
criminal offenses were defined in 506(a) of title 17 (the Copyright Act).”). 
128 Saperstein, supra note 115, at 1480–81; Note, The Criminalization of Copyright 
Infringement, supra note 99, at 1711. 
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revenues attributed to software piracy led Congress to enact the Copyright 
Felony Act of 1992.
129
  “Prior to the passage of this Act, only unauthorized 
copying of sound recordings, motion pictures, or audiovisual works 
constituted a federal felony.  The [1992] Copyright Felony Act protects all 




However, up until the passage of the No Electronic Theft Act (NET 
Act) in 1997,
131
 people who infringed upon copyrighted works for non-
commercial purposes were not subject to criminal penalties.  This changed 
after the case of United States v. LaMacchia.
132
  LaMacchia was an MIT 
student who facilitated the unlawful uploading and downloading of 
software programs through an electronic bulletin board that he had set up.
133
  
The court could not find him guilty under the Copyright Act because of the 
fact that LaMacchia had infringed with no financial motivation.
134
  This 
case was particularly poignant for the software industry because it 
symbolized the kind of damage that could be done with simple and 
accessible digital technology.
135
  Congress was thus spurred by the courts 
and the affected industries to broaden the scope of criminal liability to deter 
copyright offenders who had no financial motivation.
136
  Accordingly, the 
NET Act allowed “the prosecution of individuals who willfully violated 




In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act took the increasing 
 
129 Copyright Felony Act, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992); Note, The 
Criminalization of Copyright Infringement, supra note 99, at 1711–12. 
130 Grimm, Guzzi & Rupp, supra note 42, at 763. 
131 No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
132 United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994). 
133 Id. at 536. 
134 Id. at 540, 545. 
135 Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement, supra note 99, at 1712 
(“Anyone can now commit major copyright infringement because of the widespread 
accessibility of copying technology and the technology’s ability to make perfect 
reproductions.”). 
136 Morea, supra note 64, at 215 (“The basic idea underlying the NET Act was that 
infringers who did not act for financial gain should still face severe consequences for their 
actions, which would hopefully deter the wrongful behavior of individuals such as David 
LaMacchia.”).  Besides the LaMacchia case and industry support, Loren attributes the NET 
Act to the “increasingly prevalent view of copyright as property equivalent to automobiles 
and jewelry.”  Loren, supra note 95, at 850. 
137 Morea, supra note 64, at 216. 
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criminalization even one step further,
138
 criminalizing the use and 




The Anti-Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 2004 criminalized 
trafficking “counterfeit and illicit labels” attached to copyrighted works.
140
  
To combat movie piracy, the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 
2005 was enacted to impose criminal penalties on anyone who uses an 
audiovisual recording device in a movie theater.
141
 
Finally, in 2008 Congress passed the Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act (PRO-IP Act).
142
  The Act 
addresses counterfeiting and infringement together, expanding forfeiture 
and restitution arrangements.
143
  It “designates criminal copyright 
infringement ‘a felony,’ replacing the more ambiguous term of ‘offense,’ 
effectively eliminating IP misdemeanors.”
144
  Among other reasons, 
Congress saw fit to pass the bill because it reasoned that billions of dollars 




Thus, in the last one hundred years, criminal copyright infringement in 
the U.S. has not only been expanded to include every type of copyrighted 
work but has also been subjected to tougher sanctions.  Congress has 
responded to the increasing piracy rates, large-scale infringements, and 
relative ease of copying works in the digital era by imposing increasingly 
harsh penalties for infringing conduct.  The effect of these criminal 
 
138 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
139 Hardy, supra note 74, at 320–22. 
140 Anti-Counterfeiting Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 108-482, 118 Stat. 3912 (2004); 
Grimm, Guzzi & Rupp, supra note 42, at 766 (describing the provisions of the Act). 
141 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218; 
Grimm, Guzzi & Rupp, supra note 42, at 764 (describing the provisions of the Act). 
142 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256. 
143 Pyun, supra note 33, at 376–78. 
144 Id. at 376. 
145 Section 503 of the PRO-IP Act states that 
counterfeiting and infringement results in billions of dollars in lost revenue for United States 
companies each year and even greater losses to the United States economy in terms of reduced 
job growth, exports, and competitiveness; the growing number of willful violations of existing 
Federal criminal laws involving counterfeiting and infringement by actors in the United States 
and, increasingly, by foreign-based individuals and entities is a serious threat to the long-term 
vitality of the United States economy and the future competitiveness of United States industry; 
terrorists and organized crime utilize piracy, counterfeiting, and infringement to fund some of 
their activities . . . . 
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provisions will be discussed in the next Part. 
V. THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT PROVISIONS 
Whether criminal copyright provisions have actually reduced 
infringement is a matter up for debate.  Most of the empirical analysis on 
the subject points to increasing piracy and infringement rates, which 
underscores the lack of impact that criminal copyright provisions may be 
having.  With the enhancement of criminal penalties, many commentators 
cried out against the potentially negative effects such penalties would have 
on the advancement of free speech and the preservation of fair use.  Yet, the 
fruition of such negative effects is also contested.  The following Section 
outlines the available commentary on the effects of criminal copyright 
provisions. 
A. DETERRENT EFFECT AND ENFORCEMENT 
Ascertaining the effectiveness of criminal copyright provisions is 
difficult.  As recently as June 2010, the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) called on federal agencies to “review 
existing civil and criminal penalties to ensure that they are providing an 
effective deterrent to infringement.”
146
  In the white paper that followed in 
March 2011, IPEC did not address the effectiveness of the current criminal 
copyright provisions in place but noted that continuing online piracy was a 
key concern.
147
  IPEC recommended that Congress increase sentence 
lengths for members of organized crime groups involved in intellectual 
property infringement, repeat infringers, and copyright offenders who sell 
infringing goods that are used in national defense and law enforcement.
148
  
Moreover, the white paper recommended that the use of technologies such 




In order for criminal copyright provisions to be effective, they have to 
be enforced.  However, criminal prosecution is significantly less common 
 
146 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 19 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty_strategic_plan.pdf. 
147 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION’S WHITE PAPER ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ip_white_paper.pdf. 
148 Id. at 1–2. 
149 Id. at 2. 




  Copyright infringement and piracy are 
particularly difficult to counter with enforcement because infringers are 
able to avoid detection through the use of developing technologies.  
Prosecuting infringers is further burdened by the high costs of bringing 
forth a suit.
151
  Not surprisingly, for the year 2010, the DOJ reported that its 
attorneys received 132 investigative matters concerning 18 U.S.C. § 2319, 
which prohibits criminal infringement of a copyright; these matters 
involved a total of 174 defendants.
152
  Of the 132 investigative matters, 84 
were resolved or terminated and only 74 cases were actually filed against 83 
defendants.
153
  Only 31 defendants received a prison sentence.
154
  Of these, 
only 17 defendants received more than a year in prison: 12 defendants 
received between one and two years, 3 defendants received between two 
and three years, and 2 defendants received between three and five years.
155
 
As noted previously, the success of criminal enforcement measures is 
uncertain.
156
  Recent studies on piracy rates have found that 17.5% of 
internet traffic in the United States was estimated to be infringing 
activity.
157
  Infringing traffic on peer-to-peer networks was the highest, 
amounting to 13.8% of all internet traffic.
158
  Indeed, about half of all 
 
150 Kim F. Natividad, Stepping It Up and Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil & 
Criminal Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 480 (2008). 
151 Id. at 470. 
152 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
app. E (2010).  The automated case management system used to collect data for the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices does not separately identify copyright infringement cases where the 
infringer advertises the infringing work online or makes the infringing work available on the 
internet for download, reproduction, performance, or distribution by others.  Id.  It is an 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2319 to willfully infringe a copyright for purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain, or through large-scale, unlawful reproduction or 
distribution of a copyrighted work, regardless of whether there was a profit motive.  Id. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See also Representative Zoe Lofgren’s remarks to Victoria Espinel, U.S. Intellectual 
Property Enforcement Coordinator: “there is a lot of large-scale commercial piracy that is 
going on, and the Department is doing very little about it.  I think that that is something that 
needs attention.  And some of the people who are into copyright enforcement in Silicon 
Valley . . . thought [enforcement] was small time and the big fish are getting away.  And I 
think that that needs some attention.”  Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22–23 (2011) (Rep. Zoe Lofgren’s 
remarks to Victoria Espinel, U.S. Intellectual Prop. Enforcement Coordinator). 
157 An Estimate of Infringing Use on the Internet, ENVISIONAL 3 (Jan. 2011), 
http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-Jan2011.pdf. 
158 Id. at 3. 
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Americans ages twelve to twenty-two with access to the internet have 
illegally downloaded music from peer-to-peer networks.
159
  Downloading 
music from file-sharing networks is not limited to teens and young adults.  
Over a quarter of internet users between the ages of thirty and forty-nine 
and 12% of users over fifty partake in illegal file-sharing.
160
  Moreover, in 
their 2010 Global Piracy Study, the Business Software Alliance reported 




These numbers and studies indicate that piracy is thriving in the United 
States and around the globe.  Consequently, the effect of U.S. enforcement 
efforts in curbing infringement activities is yet to be seen. 
B. THE NET ACT 
The increasing criminalization of copyright infringement in the NET 
Act led to fears that small-scale infringers would be prosecuted, fair use 
would be disregarded, universities would remove potentially infringing 
material from the internet, and minors would be prosecuted.
162
  According 
to Eric Goldman, at least up until 2003, these fears did not come to fruition, 
as the DOJ’s prosecutions focused upon large-scale commercial 
infringements committed without the intent to gain profits.
163
 
Although there were prosecutions under the NET Act, Goldman argues 
that the legislation has not had an impact on piracy and infringement 
rates.
164
  Studies on piracy rates have not demonstrated any dips due to the 
 
159 See Miriam Bitton, Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 97 
(2011). 
160 Id. 
161 See 09 Piracy Report, BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (May 2010), http://portal.bsa
.org/globalpiracy2009/studies/09_Piracy_Study_Report_A4_final_111010.pdf. 
162 Goldman, supra note 86, at 393–96; see also Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair 
Use, and Willfulness—Is Congress Making a Scarecrow of the Law?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27 
(2002) (discussing the potential pitfalls of the NET Act and arguing that the Act itself just 
may not be necessary in the first place in terms of stopping piracy and infringement because 
criminal penalties are not the correct tool for correcting infringing behavior); Loren, supra 
note 95, at 861–71 (discussing the potential overbreadth of the NET Act, the lack of clarity 
regarding the fair use defense, and the fear that prosecutors will pursue small-scale offenders 
who infringe without a profit motive); Neri, supra note 73, at 755–57 (detailing the potential 
administrative and public backlash to laws that are incompatible with social norms; Neri 
concludes that administrative backlash to the NET Act is demonstrated by the limited 
prosecutions up until 2003, and that a public backlash has not occurred because the Act is 
rarely applied). 
163 Goldman, supra note 86, at 392. 
164 Id. at 397–99. 




  Goldman explains that the lack of any empirical proof on the 
positive effect of the Act is due to a number of factors, the first of which is 
a lack of enforcement.
166
  In addition, the number of cases the DOJ 
prosecutes corresponds to its limited budget.  Finally, public awareness of 
the NET Act’s existence is also uncertain.  These factors, coupled with the 
social norms supporting infringement behavior and the low probability of 
“getting caught” reduce public compliance.
167
  Moreover, Goldman 
explains that other civil law remedies and criminal laws deter infringers 
more than criminal copyright provisions do.  Those other laws thereby 
reduce the effectiveness of the NET Act’s criminal penalties.
168
  If anything, 
Goldman asserts that the NET Act imposes social costs.  Many Americans 
can be considered criminals due to the Act’s broad provisions, which would 




C. THE DMCA 
In March 2010, the Electronic Frontier Foundation released a report 
entitled Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years Under the DMCA.
170
  
According to the report, the DMCA jeopardized free speech and scientific 
research, along with fair use, competition, and innovation.  The report cites 
a long list of cases in which free speech was threatened and scientific 
research inhibited by the threat of civil and criminal penalties and DMCA 
lawsuits.  Among them, the report describes how in 2003, J. Alex 
Halderman, a graduate student at Princeton, 
was threatened with a DMCA lawsuit after publishing a report documenting 
weaknesses in a CD copy-protection technology developed by SunnComm.  
Halderman revealed that merely holding down the shift key on a Windows PC would 
render SunnComm’s copy protection technology ineffective.  Furious company 
 
165
A BSA study showed that warez trading sites increased from 100,000 in 1997 to 900,000 in 
1999.  Another BSA survey from May 2002 showed that more than 80% of all Internet users 
who have downloaded commercial software have downloaded software without paying for it, 
and 25% of users who download software never pay for it.  And assuming peer-to-peer (P2P) 
file-sharing violates the Act, piracy has taken off since the Act’s passage; an estimated fifty-
seven million Americans use P2P file-sharing services and 42% of those individuals have burned 
a music CD rather than purchase it. 
Id. at 398. 
166 Id. at 399–400. 
167 Id. at 400–02. 
168 Id. at 410–14. 
169 Id. at 414–16. 
170 Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years Under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Mar. 2010), https://www.eff.org/wp/unintended-consequences-under-dmca. 
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executives then threatened legal action.  The company quickly retreated from its 
threats in the face of public outcry and negative press attention.  Although Halderman 
was spared, the controversy again reminded security researchers of their vulnerability 
to DMCA threats for simply publishing the results of their research.
171
 
Critics of criminal copyright laws argue that free speech is inhibited or 
“chilled” by criminal copyright provisions.  But in a congressional hearing 
in April 2011, Kent Walker, the general counsel for Google, Inc., reported 
that through the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system, Google had been 
able to deny access to infringing works that copyright owners reported to 
them.  Those infringing works amounted to less than 1% of the millions of 
works that Google provides access to.  Thus, the DMCA’s notice-and-
takedown system, in which the responsibility for identifying and taking 
down infringing works is shared by the copyright owner and the online 
service providers, enables millions to exercise their right to free speech 
because their “speech” will only be blocked if it infringes copyright.  Blogs, 
talkbacks, and uploaded videos are not pre-screened but rather removed ad 
hoc only if they contain infringing material.  Moreover, the DMCA’s safe 
harbors have ensured that online service providers such as Facebook, 
MySpace, YouTube, eBay, and Twitter can thrive.
172
 
The DMCA has been described as ineffective at preventing digital 
piracy, and only a limited number of criminal cases have been brought 
under it.
173
  However, its enforcement by the RIAA and MPAA has led 
universities to warn their students to stay away from infringement activities 
so as to avoid DMCA penalties.
174
  The effectiveness of these warnings, 




172 See Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. 
Parasites, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Kent Walker, 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Google, Inc.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Walker04062011.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
173 John B. Clark, Note, Copyright Law and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Do 
the Penalties Fit the Crime?, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 373, 374 
(2006); John Holland, Note, Making Money Instead of Excuses: A Market-Based Alternative 
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act That Protects Copyrights Without Diminishing 
Expression, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 292–95 (2009) (describing the ineffectiveness of 
the DMCA). 
174 Clark, supra note 173, at 395.  See, for example, the warning issued by the University 
of Missouri, St. Louis about the penalties stemming from violation of the DMCA.  IT 
Security at UM-St. Louis, U. MO.-ST. LOUIS, http://www.umsl.edu/technology/itsecurity/
dmca.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
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D. THE PRO-IP ACT 
The PRO-IP Act has been criticized for favoring industry rights over 
social norms, and consequently, requiring the DOJ to prosecute crimes that 
society does not view as such.
175
  Grace Pyun has argued that the PRO-IP 
Act broadens the gap between the public and legislature and forces law 
enforcement officials to implement laws that do not strike a proper balance 




In summary, despite the ongoing changes to copyright criminal 
provisions and the increasing sanctions over the years, there has been a 
constant global growth in piracy rates of copyrighted works.  In light of this 
gap between the strong laws on the books on the one hand and the laws’ 
insignificant effects in the U.S. on the other hand, the next Part will explore 
the international treatment of copyright criminal enforcement.  The new 
ACTA initiative will be introduced and compared to existing enforcement 
regimes.  The next Part will also question the utility of ACTA’s criminal 
enforcement provisions, given the United States’ experience to date with 
copyright criminal enforcement, and suggest a better approach for the 
criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
VI. CRIMINALIZATION OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM BERNE TO ACTA 
This Part will discuss the way international law has handled 
intellectual property law enforcement to date.  First, the TRIPS agreement 
will be discussed.  As the first international agreement that has provided 
effective enforcement measures against violations of intellectual property 
rights, the TRIPS agreement will provide a baseline for comparison to the 
TRIPS-plus standards enumerated in ACTA.  Next, a brief history of the 
ACTA will be provided and the reasons for its initiation and its objectives 
for heightened intellectual property rights enforcement will be discussed.  
Finally, a critical analysis of the ACTA is presented, touching upon its 
flawed design and unrealistic goals, as well as offering some better designs 
for a more efficient enforcement framework. 
Before the TRIPS agreement took effect in 1995,
177
 enforcement of 
intellectual property rights was hardly mentioned in other international 
 
175 Pyun, supra note 33, at 388–94. 
176 Id. 
177 TRIPS, supra note 5. 




  TRIPS came to fill that vacuum with comprehensive 
international standards for the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism through the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  Through Part III of the TRIPS agreement, 
ground rules for judicial and administrative procedures, remedies, and 
criminal enforcement were established. 
The following Section will first provide an overview of the TRIPS 
enforcement provisions, with a particular focus upon its criminal 
enforcement provisions.  Next, the criticism concerning the effectiveness of 
the enforcement provisions will be outlined.  Then the WTO’s most recent 
panel report addressing enforcement provisions will be analyzed, and 
finally, its ramifications for future enforcement will be discussed. 
A. TRIPS ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
1. Part I Through Part IV: Articles 41–60 
Section 1 of Part III of TRIPS requires the signatory states to ensure 
the availability of enforcement procedures that “permit effective action 
against any act of infringement . . . , including expeditious remedies to 
prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements.”
179
  The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) 
has interpreted “availability” in Section 1 to refer not only to legislation but 
also to the enforcement of that legislation.
180
  Consequently, laws that set 
criminal penalties alone do not meet the requirements of Section 1; those 
remedies must also be enforced in order to be in compliance with TRIPS.  
“Effective action” houses all the available remedies (civil, criminal, and 
border measures).
181





178 Articles 13(3) and 15 address enforcement in the Berne Convention.  Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris 
July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.  Articles 9 and 10 address enforcement in the Paris 
Convention.  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 
revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
179 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 41.1. 
180 INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 3 (2004), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Oct19_TRIPS.pdf. 
181 Id. 
182 Id.  But see Report of the Panel, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, § 7.578, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/362r_e.pdf (describing the term 
“deterrent” in Article 61 as a flexible, imprecise concept whose interpretation depends upon 
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2. Criminal Enforcement Provisions: Article 61 
Article 61 obligates signatory states to adopt criminal procedures and 
penalties in cases where willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright 
piracy has occurred.  Such infringements must be on a commercial scale.  
Furthermore, the criminal penalties must include imprisonment or a 
substantial monetary fine or both, of a magnitude sufficient to deter 
infringement.  The remedies available must also be consistent with those 
“applied for [property] crimes of a corresponding gravity.”
183
  In addition, 
where appropriate, the remedies must include the seizure, forfeiture, and 
destruction of the infringing goods and any materials that have been used to 
commit the crime of infringement.
184
  Article 61 gives member states the 
discretion to provide criminal procedures and penalties for the infringement 
of intellectual property rights, besides trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy.  Thus, for example, criminal procedures and penalties can 
be applied to infringement that was not willful or committed on a 
commercial scale. 
Moreover, seizure, forfeiture, and destruction can come together as a 
package.
185
  Returning seized goods only facilitates continued piracy and 
negates the requirement that remedies must act as deterrents. 
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIPS ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
From the outset, the minimum enforcement standards required by 
TRIPS were criticized by scholars as being too vague and difficult to 
enforce in practice.
 
 Professors Jerome Reichman and David Lange called 
the enforcement provisions the Achilles’ heel of the TRIPS agreement.
186
  
They contended that the provisions are “crafted as broad legal standards, 
rather than as narrow rules, and their inherent ambiguity will make it harder 
for mediators or dispute-settlement panels to pin down clear-cut violations 
of international law.”
187
  This vague minimum standard, and the fact that 
 
circumstances). 
183 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 61; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 492 (3d ed. 2008) (interpreting “similar gravity” as 
corresponding to “serious crimes against property”). 
184 Gervais, supra note 183, at 492 (noting that the materials used to help commit the 
offense include manufacturing and reproduction equipment). 
185 TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 46, 61. 
186 J. H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case 
for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property 
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 34–40 (1998) (discussing the weaknesses in 
the enforcement provisions). 
187 Id. at 35; see also Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.-China WTO 
 
2012] ACTA CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 97 
 
the provisions are worded to provide deference to different legal systems, 
make it even more difficult for rights holders to effectively enforce their 
rights.
188
  Christine Thelen noted that developing countries would find it 
especially challenging to enforce because they lacked the institutions 
necessary to do so.
189
  Even more troubling for TRIPS was the observation 
that it could render the existence of prosecutorial discretion a violation of 
international law.
190
  Moreover, according to some commentators, the 
ACTA is a product of developed nations’ frustration with the TRIPS 
agreement, whose enforcement mechanisms were viewed as ineffective.
191
 
The 2009 WTO Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Panel Report), 
was the first to interpret the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS 
agreement comprehensively.
192
  As such, it had the potential to provide 
valuable guidance in interpreting how some of the vaguer provisions should 
be understood and implemented by signatory states.  As set forth below, the 
decision unsurprisingly exposed the TRIPS agreement’s weaknesses rather 
than its strengths. 
The remainder of this subpart shows how the China–U.S. dispute over 
the Panel Report exposed the deficiencies of TRIPS and prompted the 
 
Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 116 (2008) (noting that member 
states are given “considerable latitude in fashioning laws to meet their enforcement 
obligations” because the enforcement provisions contain “vague phrases such as ‘effective,’ 
‘reasonable,’ ‘undue,’ ‘unwarranted,’ ‘fair and equitable,’ and ‘not . . . unnecessarily 
complicated or costly’”). 
188 Reichman & Lange, supra note 186, at 35–36. 
189 Christine Thelen, Comment, Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Tools for Securing 
Successful TRIPS Implementation, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 519, 525–26 (2005); 
see also Rama John Ruppenthal, Note, TRIPS Through the Far East: High Tech Product 
Piracy and the Need for Alternative Regional Solutions, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 143, 169–70 
(explaining how TRIPS enforcement measures are intended for nations and not regions, and 
thus do not properly address piracy in East Asia, where piracy takes place on a regional 
level). 
190 Tuan N. Samahon, Note, TRIPS Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition 
and Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1051, 1052 (2000) (“What happens after January 1, 2000, when 
developing country WTO members have appropriate intellectual property measures and 
enforcement provisions on their books, but limited or no actual enforcement occurs?  May a 
developing country reply to a TRIPS violation claim that its statutory enactments fulfill 
WTO obligations and that actual enforcement of its laws is uniquely a matter of 
prosecutorial or judicial discretion?”). 
191 Kimberlee Weatherall, Politics, Compromise, Text and the Failures of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 229, 237 (2011). 
192 Report of the Panel, supra note 182. 
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adoption of ACTA, with stronger requirements for criminal penalties.  The 
discussion of ACTA’s criminal penalties resumes in Section C. 
1. The Case 
The United States turned to the WTO dispute settlement body, 
claiming that China’s laws were not in accordance with the TRIPS 
agreement.
193
  First, the United States claimed that China’s thresholds for 
criminal liability were too high, thereby exempting counterfeiting and 
piracy acts from criminal procedures and penalties in violation of Articles 
61 and 41.  Second, the United States contended that China’s measures 
regarding the disposal of confiscated, infringing goods were incompatible 
with its obligations under Article 59 and 46.  Third, the United States 
claimed that unauthorized works (i.e., those that did not pass Chinese 
censorship) were not awarded copyright protection, in violation of the 
Berne Convention (which is incorporated through Article 9.1 of the TRIPS 
agreement) and Article 41.1 of the TRIPS agreement. 
It is also important to note that the United States limited its claims to 
Chinese law, as opposed to Chinese enforcement in practice.
194
  While the 
panel’s decision touched on the details of Chinese treatment of impounded 
infringing goods and the extent to which a country can deny copyright 
protection, the heart of the decision, from our perspective, is how the panel 
approached the thresholds of criminal liability. 
2. The Panel’s Decision 
The United States claimed that China’s criminal thresholds were too 
high, thereby preventing the imposition of criminal liability for copyright 
piracy and trademark counterfeiting.  Before ascertaining whether the 
United States’ claim was valid, the panel had to interpret what “willful and 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale” meant, 
in order to determine whether the cases that fell below the criminal 
thresholds constituted counterfeiting or piracy.
195
  If there were such cases 
that were excluded by Chinese law, then China would not be in compliance 
with Article 61. 
The focal point of the dispute was in the interpretation of “commercial 
 
193 Id. §§ 2.2–.4, 8.1–.2. 
194 Jan Bohanes & Adrian Emch, WTO Panel Report on China-IPR: A Mixed Result, 
CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar. 2009, at 19–20, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1516907. 
195 Report of the Panel, supra note 182, §§ 7.479, 7.517. 
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scale.”  The United States claimed that the term encompassed not only 
actions “of a sufficient extent or magnitude to qualify as ‘commercial scale’ 
in the relevant market,”
196
 but also commercial activities undertaken with a 
motive for profit.
197
  China, in turn, argued that the United States’ definition 
completely removed “scale” from the term itself and should therefore be 
rejected.
198
  The panel recognized the term as flexible, imprecise, and 
contingent upon circumstances.
199
  The panel rejected the United States’ 
definition, opting to define commercial scale as “counterfeiting or piracy 
carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity 
with respect to a given product in a given market . . . .  The magnitude or 
extent of typical or usual commercial activity relates, in the longer term, to 
profitability.”
200
  “Commercial scale” also applies in cases of technological 
infringement (i.e., the term is technology-neutral).
201
  Moreover, in response 
to China’s claim that Article 41.5 does not require member states to allocate 
more resources toward prosecuting intellectual property infringement 
(which China claimed would occur if it must lower its criminal threshold 
and thereby prosecute more cases), the panel further stated that its 
interpretation was limited to “the issue of what acts of infringement must be 
criminalized and not those which must be prosecuted.”
202
 
The panel opined that the United States must back up with evidence its 
claim that China excluded willful, commercial-scale piracy and 
counterfeiting.
203
  It dismissed the United States’ claim on evidentiary 
grounds, stating that that the evidence provided was “too little and too 
random to demonstrate a level that constitutes a commercial scale for any 
product in China.”
204
  The panel could not “distinguish between acts that, in 
China’s marketplace, are on a commercial scale, and those that are not.”
205
  
The press articles which the United States provided to prove its claims were 
also found to be insufficient to make a prima facie case against China.
206
 
The United States also claimed that the criminal thresholds that 
 
196 Id. § 7.480. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. § 7.481. 
199 Id. § 7.578.  In that same section, the panel also noted that terms such as “deterrent” 
and “corresponding gravity” were of a similar, flexible nature. 
200 Id. § 7.577. 
201 Id. § 7.657. 
202 Id. § 7.596. 
203 Id. § 7.602. 
204 Id. § 7.617. 
205 Id. § 7.609. 
206 Id. § 7.629. 
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applied only took into account value and volume, as opposed to other 
“indicia of commercial scale operations, such as the presence of unfinished 
products and fake packaging.”
207
  The panel dismissed this claim as well, 
citing as grounds for dismissal the lack of evidence that such indicia was 
not taken into account.
208
  In addition, the panel addressed the question of 
whether the term “commercial scale” requires authorities to take this other 
indicia into account.  The panel found it unlikely that Article 61 created a 
broader “obligation addressing issues of evidence and procedure.”
209
 
Finally, the panel emphasized that it did not provide any position on 
whether Article 61 applied to “counterfeiting and piracy committed without 
any purpose of financial gain.”
210
  As Peter Yu aptly summarized, “without 
determining whether China had satisfied its TRIPS obligations, the WTO 




The Panel Report is largely seen as having failed to improve 
intellectual property enforcement.
212
  Joost Pauwelyn remarked that the 
report casts doubt as to TRIPS’s ability to ensure intellectual property 
enforcement in signatory states.
213
  According to Peter Yu, the report “also 
signals to other less developed countries that the TRIPS agreement does not 
require the high TRIPS-plus standards of intellectual property protection 
and enforcement that are now being advanced through bilateral, plurilateral, 
and regional trade and investment agreements as well as the proposed 
ACTA.”
214
  The report further reinforces the considerable leeway given to 
members in implementing TRIPS.
215
 
Given that the claims and report focused only on China’s legislation 
and not upon the quality of its enforcement, it remains unclear what the 
rules would be if a TRIPS signatory state enacted criminal penalties but did 
not effectively enforce the legislation.  This point is particularly poignant 
 
207 Id. § 7.633. 
208 Id. § 7.652. 
209 Id. § 7.651. 
210 Id. § 7.662. 
211 Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1069 (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
212 Id. at 41. 
213 Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That Barked but Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual 
Property Disputes at the WTO, 33, 35 (Nov. 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708026. 
214 Yu, supra note 211, at 41. 
215 Weatherall, supra note 191, at 237; Yu, supra note 211, at 45. 
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with China, which, even if forced to lower criminal thresholds, would not 
have to change its enforcement of such laws.
216
 
In addition, Peter Yu notes that the Panel Report emphasized that 
initiating the enforcement of intellectual property rights through Sections II, 
III, and IV is the responsibility of the rights holder.
217
  This places the 
burden on the rights holder rather than the government.  Likewise, the panel 
also “rejected the use of recently-negotiated bilateral, plurilateral, and 
regional trade and investment agreements as a relevant subsequent practice 
for determining the term ‘commercial scale.’”
218
  The decision benefits 
countries who are not signatories to such agreements.
219
  Finally, because 
there was not a clear winner in the dispute, less developed countries need 
not be deterred from bringing forth a claim against developed countries.
220
 
In summary, the China–U.S. WTO dispute exposed the weaknesses of 
the TRIPS agreement and has played a role in bringing about the serious 
consideration of ACTA.  Because developed countries criticized the TRIPS 
agreement for being outdated, failing to recognize digital advancements, 
and not adequately addressing piracy and counterfeiting as illustrated by the 
China–U.S. case, developed countries began to push for heightened 
enforcement standards for intellectual property rights and ultimately to the 
negotiations of the ACTA.
221
 
C. THE ACTA AGREEMENT 
The ACTA aims to increase international cooperation and enforcement 
 
216 Jung Yun Yang, Bringing the Question of Chinese IPR Enforcement to the WTO 
Under TRIPS: An Effective Strategy or a Meaningless and Overused Tactic by the U.S.?, 10 
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 14–15 (2010) (“The problem at issue does not seem to arise 
from China’s reluctance to amend and enact domestic laws, giving higher IPRs, but rather 
from China’s failure to enforce such laws.”). 
217 Yu, supra note 211, at 45–46; Report of the Panel, supra note 182, § 7.247. 
218 Yu, supra note 211, at 46. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 47. 
221 See Reichman & Lange, supra note 186, at 34–39 (discussing the weaknesses in the 
enforcement provisions).  Note, however, that some scholars and activists suggest that 
ACTA is simply an attempt to get even stronger property rights.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Judge 
& Saleh Al-Sharieh, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) on 
Canadian Copyright Law 6 (Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual Prop., Am. U. Wash. C. 
L. Digital Commons, Research Paper No. 13, 2010), available at  http://digitalcommons.wcl
.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=research (“ACTA’s claimed 
purpose as a treaty against piracy and counterfeiting is surrounded by the suspicion that 
ACTA is merely a new battle to win the long going war over more absolute control of 
intellectual property.”). 
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in order to combat the proliferation of trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy in the twenty-first century.
222
  Derided as the “Anti-China 
Trade Alliance,”
223
 the ACTA has caused a firestorm of debate, in part 
because the negotiations preceding it were veiled in secrecy.  This Section 
intends to briefly trace the development of the ACTA as well as the 
justifications behind its inception.  The ACTA’s provisions in general and 
those pertaining to criminal copyright enforcement will be outlined, as well 
as what it adds beyond TRIPS
224
 and existing treaties.  The Section will 
conclude with a review of the literature criticizing the ACTA and the 
presentation of a new approach that would create a more effective 
international copyright enforcement regime. 
1. Background 
The ACTA was a product of many developed countries’ desire to 
strengthen intellectual property rights protection and enforcement in light of 
the continued “proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods as well as the 
proliferation of services that distribute infringing material.”
225
  Those 
countries wanted to establish more stringent standards for enforcement of 
copyright protections than the toothless minimum standards found in the 
TRIPS agreement.
226
  Notably, the agreement was negotiated outside of the 
accepted WTO and WIPO
227
 forums because of frustration with the 
“apparent multilateral stalemate on enforcement” in those forums.
228
  A 
more exclusive negotiating forum would enable developed countries to 
establish standards that lean towards a maximalist approach to copyright 
protection and away from a minimalist approach.
229
 
The framework for the ACTA agreement was first developed by Japan 
 
222 ACTA, supra note 4, pmbl. 
223 Yu, supra note 6, at 998 (quoting Susan Scafidi, ACTA Up!, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Oct. 
24, 2007, 11:51 AM), http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2007/10/acta_up.php.).  “ACTA” 
officially stands for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. 
224 TRIPS, supra note 5. 
225 ACTA, supra note 4, pmbl. 
226 Emily Ayoob, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 175, 182–83 (2010). 
227 WIPO is the World Intellectual Property Organization, an agency of the United 
Nations. 
228 Weatherall, supra note 191; see also Kaminski, supra note 12, at 388. 
229 Weatherall, supra note 191; see also Kaminski, supra note 12, at 388–89 (describing 
how countries with maximalist IP goals switched from the WIPO forum to the WTO forum, 
and then from the WTO forum to the ACTA forum in order to establish stronger protection 
and enforcement standards). 




  Following Japan’s proposal of an anti-counterfeiting treaty, the 
U.S. also called for countries that protect intellectual property rights to 
work together to formulate a new plan for strengthening enforcement.
231
  In 
2007, the United States announced its intent to negotiate an anti-
counterfeiting trade agreement with Canada, the European Union, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland.
232
  The goal of the 
undertaking was to “set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement.”
233
  
Several informal discussions took place in 2007, and by the middle of 2008 
the participating countries had entered into negotiations.
234
  Eleven rounds 
of negotiations followed before the countries finalized the ACTA.
235
  The 
agreement was altered several times, as it came under open criticism when 
leaked to the public.
236
  However, by the end of 2010, the final agreement 
was released.
237
  Legal verification was completed by April 2011, and the 




The ACTA is divided into six chapters.  The discussion below will 
highlight the ACTA’s key enforcement provisions while paying special 
attention to its criminal enforcement measures pertaining to copyrights.  In 
ACTA’s first chapter, the nature and scope of a party’s obligations are 
described along with general definitions. 
Chapter II of the ACTA establishes the legal framework for enforcing 
intellectual property rights.  Section 2 of chapter II obligates member states 
to make available civil judicial procedures for enforcing intellectual 
property rights.
239
  Section 3 of chapter II sets forth the rules governing 
 
230 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 389; Yu, supra note 6, at 980. 
231 Yu, supra note 6, at 6–7 (citing Declaration of Stanford McCoy at 4–5, EFF v. Office 
of the U.S. Trade Rep., No. 08–1599 (RMC), (D.D.C. filed 2009)). 
232 Ambassador Schwab, supra note 11.  Australia, Singapore, and Morocco eventually 
joined the negotiations, with the noteworthy absence of China and India—countries with 
excessive piracy and counterfeiting rates.  See David M. Quinn, A Critical Look at the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. ¶¶ 3–4 (2011), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i4/article16.pdf. 
233 Ambassador Schwab, supra note 11. 
234 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 389. 
235 Ambassador Schwab, supra note 11. 
236 Quinn, supra note 232, ¶ 31; Yu, supra note 6, at 1016–17. 
237 ACTA, supra note 4. 
238 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/fo/intellect_property.aspx?view=d. 
239 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 7, para. 1. 
104 MIRIAM BITTON [Vol. 102 
 
border measures, which do not apply to patents and trademarks.
240
  Border 
measures apply not only to imports but also to exports and in-transit 
goods.
241
  Customs authorities must be given the authority to act on their 
own initiative, and rights holders must be allowed to request competent 
authorities to “suspend the release of suspected goods.”
242
 
Most importantly, criminal enforcement is tackled in Section 4 of 
Chapter II.  This section applies to copyrights, patents, and trademarks.  
Article 23 requires member states to provide for criminal penalties for 
willful “trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a 
commercial scale.”
243
  Commercial scale is defined to include acts “carried 
out as commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage.”
244
  Criminal penalties must also be available in cases of label 
and packaging offenses and unlawful copying of movies in cinemas.
245
  
Aiding and abetting infringement must also be subject to criminal 
liability.
246
  All offenses must be punishable with imprisonment and 
monetary fines.
247
  Article 25 dictates that competent authorities must have 
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction powers and describes how those powers 
should be applied.  Article 26 enables ex officio enforcement—the power to 
detain articles suspected of being counterfeit or infringing by customs 
officials acting without a judicial detention order. 
Section 5 of chapter II addresses the heated topic of enforcing 
intellectual rights in the digital environment.  Article 27 extends civil and 
criminal enforcement to infringing acts that occur on the internet.  
Enforcement procedures apply to “unlawful use of means of widespread 
distribution for infringing purposes,”
248
 which could “target both 
commercial and non-commercial peer-to-peer file-sharing.”
249
  Such 
procedures must be implemented so that they do not violate freedom of 
expression, fair process, or privacy principles.
250
  In addition, Article 27 
calls on member states to “provide adequate legal protection and effective 
 
240 Id. at E-9 n.6. 
241 Id. at E-9. 
242 Id. at E-9 to -10. 
243 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 23. 
244 Id. at E-12. 
245 Id. at E-12 to -13. 
246 Id. at E-13. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at E-15. 
249 Quinn, supra note 232, ¶ 15. 
250 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 2. 
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legal remedies against the circumvention” of technological measures used 
to protect rights holders’ works.  Furthermore, the ACTA sets forth 
provisions protecting electronic rights management information.
251
  These 
provisions are similar to the DMCA.
252
 
Chapter III addresses best enforcement practices and Chapter IV 
discusses international cooperation.  Chapter V establishes the “ACTA 
Committee,” a separate body from the WIPO and WTO.
253
  Among other 
things, it has the authority to review the implementation of the agreement, 
proposed amendments to the agreement, and the terms for becoming a party 
to the agreement.
254
  Chapter VI contains final provisions pertaining to 




3. The ACTA and TRIPS 
The ACTA builds upon the minimal TRIPS standards by heightening 
the standards for civil enforcement, border measures, and criminal 




At the very start of the agreement, when defining “counterfeit 
trademark goods” and “pirated copyright goods,” the ACTA expands upon 
the definition given in TRIPS, defining goods as infringing in accordance 
with the law of the country where procedures “are invoked,”
257
 instead of 
the “country of importation.”
258
  This grants customs authorities the 
authority to seize goods that are merely passing though their country (as 
opposed to only the goods shipped to their country).
259
  In addition, ACTA 
defines “intellectual property” broadly, thereby protecting a greater scope of 
intellectual property rights than TRIPS did.
260
  Moreover, the definition of 
“person” includes legal persons, which will “heighten liability for 
companies challenged as direct infringers, such as search engines or peer-
 
251 Id. 
252 Quinn, supra note 232, ¶ 15. 
253 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 36. 
254 Id. art. 36, para. 2. 
255 Id. arts. 39, 41, 43. 
256 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 390–91 (discussing how the ACTA built upon the TRIPS 
agreement outside of the WTO). 
257 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 5(d). 
258 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 51. 
259 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 395–96. 
260 Id. at 396–97. 





In the area of civil enforcement, the ACTA stipulates that courts must 
be given the authority to order the destruction of infringing goods, whereas 
such a stipulation does not exist in TRIPS.
262
  Where TRIPS required that 
the seriousness of the infringement be taken into account when awarding 
civil and administrative remedies, the ACTA contains no such provision.
263
  
In contrast to TRIPS, provisional measures and injunctions are extended to 
apply to third parties, such that they can be ordered against internet service 
providers.
264
  Perhaps one of the most significant ACTA additions to the 
TRIPS standards is in regard to damages.  Article 9.1 mandates that when 
“determining the amount of damages for infringement of intellectual 
property rights . . . judicial authorities shall have the authority to consider 
. . . any legitimate measure of value the right holder submits.”
265
  This gives 
rights holders a generous alternative to TRIPS,
266
 where courts only have 
authority to order damages “adequate to compensate for the injury the right 
holder has suffered because of an infringement.”
267
  In addition, the ACTA 
requires that statutory damages be available for copyright or related rights 




Similarly, the ACTA’s section on border measures enhances TRIPS’s 
standards.  Border measures are applied to every intellectual property right 
besides patents and trademarks.
269
  The exemption of de minimis imports 
from border measures are notably reduced from “small quantities of goods 
of a non-commercial nature contained in travellers’ personal luggage or sent 
in small consignments”
270
 to only “small quantities of goods of a non-
 
261 Id. at 397. 
262 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 10.1; Kaminski, supra note 12, at 398. 
263 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 46; Kaminski, supra note 12, at 398. 
264 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1, art. 12, para. 1; Kaminski, supra note 12, at 398–
99. 
265 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 9.1. 
266 This provides the right holder with an alternative to the “strict proof-of-loss method 
of calculating damages.”  See Legal Information, Frequently Asked Questions on the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), SWISS FED. INST. OF INTELL. PROP., 
https://www.ige.ch/en/legal-info/legal-areas/counterfeiting-piracy/acta/frequently-asked-
questions.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
267 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 45. 
268 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 9, para. 3; Kaminski, supra note 12. 
269 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 13 n.6. 
270 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 60. 
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commercial nature contained in travellers’ personal luggage.”
271
  Customs 
officials may also seize in-transit goods that are not entering the country but 
are only passing through.
272
  Thus, the ACTA: 
gives rise to the seizure of goods that do not infringe in either the originating or 
importing country thereby (1) maximizing IP internationally to the standard of the IP 
maximalist countries through which goods are shipped, and (2) challenging the 




Furthermore, the ACTA applies border measures to exports as well as 
imports, where TRIPS only applied to imports.
274
 
Margot Kaminski points out that the border measures of the ACTA 
alter the previous balance struck between the interests of rights holders and 
importers to weigh in favor of rights holders.
275
  For instance, where TRIPS 
required a higher burden of proof in order to seize goods, the ACTA 
permits customs authorities to seize goods (ex officio) if they are 
“suspect.”
276
  Rights holders can also request that customs authorities 
provide them with information about particular shipments of goods, even if 
those shipments are not suspect.
277
  Moreover, the process for requesting 
that goods be seized is also easier in the ACTA and applies to a greater 
variety of intellectual property rights than the application process in 
TRIPS.
278
  Compared to TRIPS, the ACTA also reduces the penalties 
applied to applicants who abuse the application process and the liability of 
customs officials.
279
  With regard to the avenues of recourse for importers, 
the ACTA also limits the paths opened in TRIPS.
280
 
Criminal enforcement is significantly strengthened in the ACTA 
agreement.  The scope of enforcement is broadened to include piracy of 
 
271 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 14, para. 2. 
272 Id. art. 16, para. 2. 
273 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 403. 
274 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 16, para. 1; Kaminski, supra note 228, at 404. 
275 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 401. 
276 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 16.; Kaminski, supra note 228, at 401.  Because this 
provision authorizes warrantless searches without probable cause, it might appear to create 
possible conflicts with the Fourth Amendment if ACTA is implemented in the United States.  
However, searches at the border have long been treated as reasonable searches under the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of probable cause.  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
606, 619 (1977). 
277 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 404. 
278 Id. at 404–05. 
279 Id. at 405–06. 
280 Id. at 406–07. 
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copyright-related rights, whereas TRIPS applied only to trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy.
281
  While TRIPS did not define 
“commercial scale,” the ACTA defines it as acts “carried out as commercial 
activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage.”
282
  
According to Kaminski, “indirect economic or commercial advantages” 
may also apply to online infringement, thereby including “such benefits as 
advertising revenue or the prevention of expenditures.”
283
 
The ACTA criminalizes infringement activities that were not even 
discussed in TRIPS.
284
  Labeling and packaging (trademark) offenses, 
recording movies in theaters, and aiding and abetting infringement are all 
criminalized.
285
  Kaminski notes that the extension of criminal liability to 
legal persons who aid and abet may also include “companies such as 
Google or Facebook, for infringement by their members.”
286
 
TRIPS mandated that crimes be punishable with imprisonment or 
fines, and the ACTA mandates that crimes be punishable with 
imprisonment and fines.
287
  The ACTA also broadens provisions regarding 
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of “of defendants’ assets.”
288
  Finally, 
the ACTA permits ex officio enforcement.
289
 
In the area of digital enforcement, the ACTA breaks new ground that 
TRIPS did not even touch.  Here, the WIPO Copyright Treaty
290
 bears 
relevance, as the ACTA adds onto the obligations contained in that treaty.
291
  
The ACTA imposes liability for infringement through digital networks, 
which may include downloading and uploading on peer-to-peer networks.
292
  
In addition, the ACTA sets new international standards for acts of 
circumvention.
293
  Legal protection and remedies must be applied when 
“effective technological measures” are circumvented.
294
  According to 
 
281 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 23, para. 1; TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 61. 
282 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 23, para. 1. 
283 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 408. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 23, para. 5; Kaminski, supra note 12, at 408–09. 
287 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 24; TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 61. 
288 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 409–10. 
289 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 26; Kaminski, supra note 228, at 410. 
290 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 10, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/. 
291 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 410. 
292 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 2; Kaminski, supra note 12, at 411. 
293 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 412–13. 
294 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 5. 
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Kaminsky, effective technological measures can be “[s]ubstandard or 
poorly designed digital rights management,” which expands the scope of 
protection.
295
  Moreover, marketing circumvention devices are prohibited, 
as well as manufacturing products that are primarily designed to 
circumvent.
296
  Kaminsky argues that these provisions set a new 
international standard that stifle innovation “as new products or programs 
that have not yet found a market will be prohibited under this language so 
long as it can be shown that they circumvent technological measures.”
297
  
With regard to digital management rights, the ACTA prohibits “mak[ing] 
available” to the public copies of works whose digital management 
information has been removed.
298
  Kaminsky notes that this adds to the 




Finally, the ACTA differs from TRIPS by focusing on international 
cooperation through information sharing and assisting other member states 
in ratcheting up their enforcement capabilities.
300
  The ACTA also 
establishes a new international forum for intellectual property enforcement, 




Initially, the process behind the development of the ACTA had been 
heavily criticized for being enveloped in secrecy and negotiated outside of 
the accepted international intellectual property forums.
302
  Although part of 
this criticism was forestalled with the release of the agreement to the public 
in April 2010, commentators have continued to underscore the importance 
of negotiating sensitive enforcement issues in a public forum where the 
interests of affected parties can be expressed and debated.
303
  Moreover, 
 
295 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 413. 
296 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27. 
297 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 413. 
298 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 7(b). 
299 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 414. 
300 ACTA, supra note 4, arts. 34–35. 
301 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 36. 
302 Margaret Chon, Global Intellectual Property Governance (Under Construction), 12 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 349, 378–79 (2011) (describing how the lack of transparency raises 
questions concerning accountability and policy laundering); Quinn, supra note 232, ¶ 23; 
Yu, supra note 6, at 1074 (critically observing that because the ACTA was developed 
outside of the WTO, “[i]t throws away the many hard-earned bargains less-developed 
countries have won through the TRIPS negotiation process”). 
303 Note, Keeping Our Balance in the Face of Piracy and Counterfeiting: Limiting the 
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from an American perspective, negotiations behind closed doors may result 
in treaties that require Congressional ratification and subsequent changes 
made to U.S. law.  This kind of “heavy-handed legislating” has been 
criticized as “policy laundering.”
304
 
Kimberlee Weatherall critiques the claims that the ACTA will improve 
international law enforcement cooperation and enforcement standards.
305
  In 
regard to international cooperation, Weatherall compares the ACTA with 
other plurilateral agreements and finds that the ACTA seeks to advance 
cooperation through general provisions that lack the specific language 
contained in other agreements.
306
  Weatherall criticizes the ACTA, in 
comparison, for being “a lightweight, containing only rudimentary 
‘motherhood’ provisions stating aspirations rather than establishing real, 
tangible tools for cooperation.”
307
  Moreover, in order to be effective, 
Weatherall argues that the ACTA should have specified which acts of 
infringement were appropriate for international cooperation, instead of just 
using blanket terms such as “copyright piracy” and “trademark 
counterfeiting.”
308
  These terms include a wide range of infringements 
undeserving of international cooperation.
309
  Instead, the focus should have 
been upon willful, large-scale infringements.
310
 
Furthermore, Weatherall contends that the ACTA does not create a 
“gold standard” of enforcement, because its provisions are unclear.
311
  For 
instance, Article 9.3 does not mandate that member states instill a system 
for awarding additional damages.  Instead, it offers three different systems 
that parties may adopt.
312
  Weatherall argues that these systems are 
incoherent and do not lead to equivalent outcomes.
313
  Consequently, with 
 
Scope of Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Provisions in Free Trade Agreements, 42 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 189–90 (2010) (“By creating a new framework, outside of 
existing international bodies such as the WTO and WIPO, the ACTA is shielded from the 
necessary robust debates on the proper scope of enforcement.”). 
304 Id. at 183–84; see Quinn, supra note 232, ¶ 27 (noting that whether the ACTA is an 
executive agreement or a treaty (and therefore subject to Senate approval) is up for debate). 
305 Weatherall, supra note 191, at 230–31; see also Yu, supra note 6, at 1073 
(questioning whether the ACTA is likely to set more effective international intellectual 
property enforcement norms when TRIPS failed to do so). 
306 Weatherall, supra note 191, at 238–40. 
307 Id. at 239. 
308 Id. at 241–42. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 242. 
311 Id. 243–44. 
312 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 9, para. 3. 
313 Weatherall, supra note 191, at 259. 
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each nation adopting a different system (which accommodates its own 
domestic legislation), the level of punitive damages will vary from state to 
state, thereby bypassing the ACTA’s aim to establish clear standards.
314
  In 
sum, Weatherall claims that the ACTA avoids setting coherent standards in 
favor of “politically expedient” provisions.
315
 
Margot Kaminski has criticized the ACTA on several fronts.  In its 
preamble, the ACTA describes piracy and counterfeiting as funding 
organized crime, when the connection between online infringement and 
organized crime has yet to be proven.
316
  The preamble also hints toward 
graduated-response terminations of internet connections of people who 
repeatedly infringe online.
317
  Kaminski also criticizes the lack of 
exceptions given in the preamble for fair use and other principles.
318
 
Kaminski notes that with regard to privacy and disclosure of 
information, the ACTA does not have an auditing system that will ensure its 
stipulation that “the Party receiving the information shall, subject to its law 
and practice, refrain from disclosing or using the information for a purpose 
other than that for which the information was provided.”
319
  Kaminski 
criticizes the damages system in the ACTA, which allows judicial 
authorities to award damages based on “any legitimate measure of value the 
right holder submits.”
320
  Because it is very hard to measure the losses 
accrued from infringement, she considers this measurement 
inappropriate.
321
  Furthermore, Article 11 allows the judicial authorities to 
order infringers (who could be internet service providers) to disclose the 
identity of people involved in the infringement.  According to Kaminski, 




In terms of border measures, Kaminski states that the authority to seize 
in-transit goods undermines the sovereignty of shipping countries.
323
  With 
regard to criminal enforcement, the definition of “commercial scale” is 
 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 231. 
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318 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 394–95. 
319 ACTA, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2; Kaminski, supra note 12, at 395. 
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322 Id. at 401. 
323 Id. at 403. 
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worrisome because it has the potential to apply to a wide scope of people 
(from online infringers to shipping companies).
324
  Moreover, making 
imprisonment a mandatory penalty is problematic because “criminal law 
systems of different countries handle judicial and prosecutorial discretion in 
different ways, so one country’s enforcement may be far more draconian in 
practice than others.”
325
  The application of criminal liability for aiding and 
abetting to legal persons puts innovation at risk “for global online 
companies.”
326
  In the digital environment enforcement front, Kaminski 
warns that prohibiting the manufacture, distribution, or importation of a 
device which has “only a limited commercially significant purpose other 




Kaminski finds enforcement practices that mandate raising public 
awareness about respecting intellectual property rights, “the co-opting of 
government resources by private parties with an agenda regarding public 
perception.”
328
  In regard to the ACTA Committee, Kaminski points out the 
transparency of the Committee’s operations are not guaranteed in the 
ACTA.
329
  Moreover, Michael Geist has observed that the ACTA 




5. ACTA: The Road Ahead 
The ACTA has been the subject of many criticisms pertaining to its 
different provisions in general and its criminal enforcement measures in 
particular.  This Article focused on the ACTA’s criminal enforcement 
measures by exploring the theoretical foundations for employing criminal 
law in the intellectual property law field as well as exploring the American 
experience in this field and what lessons can be learned from it.  Given the 
findings and criticisms outlined above, it is important to ask whether the 
ACTA will achieve its goals.  This Article thoroughly explored the 
 
324 Id. at 407–08. 
325 Id. at 409. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 413–14. 
328 Id. at 415–16. 
329 Id. at 417–18. 
330 Kaminski, supra note 12, at 417–18 (noting that the ACTA committee does not have 
to defer to the WTO’s dispute settlement system); Yu, supra note 6, at 1082 (citing Michael 
Geist, Toward an ACTA Super-Structure: How ACTA May Replace WIPO, MICHAEL GEIST 
(Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4910/125/). 
2012] ACTA CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 113 
 
intersection between copyright law and criminal law and touched upon 
major findings pertaining to this intersection.  The theoretical analysis of 
this intersection has revealed the presence of many difficulties pertaining to 
using criminal law sanctions in the copyright law realm.  The moral 
ambiguity of personal-use infringement and the obscure harm caused to 
copyright owners shake the pillars supporting the application of criminal 
law.  Additionally, as others have argued, social norms are operating 
against criminal infringement provisions, and many people do not find any 
correlation between copyright infringement and theft or other property-
oriented perspectives. 
While the social norms argument
331
 has not yet been empirically 
established, there is no doubt that copyright infringement is indeed 
widespread, suggesting that criminal enforcement is ineffective.  Therefore, 
any enhancement in criminal sanctions without more will not necessarily 
bring about a significant change.  Because the ACTA is modeled after the 
United States’ copyright criminal provisions, it is hard to see how it will 
bring about change, given the similarly stronger laws on the books.  As the 
discussion in Part IV illustrated, the U.S. provided penalties for copyright 
infringement that included both imprisonment and fines many years before 
the ACTA was introduced.
332
  Those stronger penalties were applied to 
several acts of copyright law infringement under U.S. law.  Additionally, 
applying criminal penalties to the act of aiding and abetting criminal 
conduct pertaining to copyright infringement has been part of U.S. law 
since 1897 although introduced to the ACTA only during the twenty-first 
century.
333
  Moreover, “camcording” has also been criminalized before it 
was introduced into the ACTA.
334
  Lastly, the U.S. had also introduced 
copyright enforcement measures concerning the online world early on.  It 
enacted the DMCA in the late 1990s, complying with its obligations under 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty.  It also adapted its copyright legislation so it 
responds to the introduction of the internet and the new digital world.  The 
ACTA similarly requires the introduction of measures responding to the 
online environment.  Given the U.S.’s role in initiating and promoting the 
ACTA, it is not surprising that there is great similarity between the ACTA 
and the U.S. regime. 
As the discussion in Part V showed, there are many factors that 
contributed to the failure of the U.S. enforcement scheme.  Therefore, it is 
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imperative to explore the lessons learned from the U.S. experience to the 
extent we have data and consider what steps should be taken in order to 
make the ACTA a more successful enforcement scheme. 
The U.S. copyright enforcement scheme has not accomplished its 
goals.  It did not manage to reduce piracy rates over the years, and those 
rates have constantly grown.  The possible reasons for the failure of these 
enforcement schemes are complex and cannot be accurately determined and 
measured.  However, given the discussion in Part V, it seems that the 
reasons stem from the reality that the copyright provisions were not actually 
enforced or prosecuted to the same extent as civil enforcement measures.  
In fact, criminal enforcement was significantly lower.  There are many 
reasons for the low enforcement level.  In the case of the United States, we 
can point to the burdensome high costs of bringing suits as a restraint on 
enforcement.  Additionally, some infringers are able to avoid detection 
through the use of developing technologies.  Moreover, enforcement efforts 
have focused mainly upon large-scale commercial infringements without 
the intent to gain profits rather than the more common, small-scale, non-
commercial infringement. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether there is public awareness and 
acceptance of the legal changes and enhanced criminal penalties pertaining 
to copyright infringement.  Lastly, according to some scholars, social norms 
supporting infringement behavior and the low probability of getting caught 
also contribute to the decrease in public compliance. 
Based on these explanations, it seems that the following steps can be 
taken in order to reduce piracy rates: First, more resources should be 
dedicated to combating piracy.  If more resources are dedicated to 
combating infringement, it is likely that they will lead to greater deterrence 
and an increased likelihood of catching infringers.  Second, focusing on 
non-commercial, small-scale infringers is an additional route that can be 
taken.  Third, it is also possible to increase sentence lengths and fines in 
order to achieve greater deterrence. 
While such suggestions can be made at the national level, such 
suggestions are unworkable for many reasons.  At the national level, 
increased penalties, as well as a new emphasis on non-commercial, small-
scale infringers might result in negative effects on the advancement of free 
speech and the preservation of free use.  Increased penalties and pursuing 
non-commercial small-scale infringers can have a chilling effect on many 
members of the public who might avoid taking actions that might be legal.  
As for the budget constraints, it is hard to tell how many resources will be 
required to achieve optimal deterrence in an age of widespread online and 
digital piracy.  Additionally, it is unclear whether criminal enforcement of 
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copyrights is or should be prioritized before greater enforcement of other 
crimes. 
Such solutions are even less workable in the international environment 
where it seems very likely that an increased budget for enforcement is not 
really a feasible solution.  This is especially the case with developing and 
less-developed countries, as well as with other developed economies where 
no additional resources can be dedicated to criminal enforcement.  This is 
evident especially in light of those countries’ compliance with the TRIPS 
agreement, where their inability to comply, stems, inter alia, from 
budgetary constraints. 
Assuming such solutions cannot be adopted and realizing that the 
TRIPS agreement is indeed outdated and ineffective given the major 
technological changes that have occurred since its adoption, a new approach 
concerning criminal enforcement should be adopted.  The better route to 
take should focus on a few changes: consideration of adoption of lower 
copyright protection thresholds; comprehensive educational campaigns; 
better clarity and guidance pertaining to the ACTA proposed measures; and 
budgetary assistance programs by the developed world. 
First, given the extensive critique of copyright laws on the books, it is 
evident that it is necessary to re-examine existing copyright regimes and 
consider the adoption of a new regime that is more responsive to the new 
creative environment.  Such a proposal will arguably result in less 
resistance to copyright regimes and better compliance.  Suggestions along 
this line were raised by many scholars over the years and will not be 
discussed in greater detail.
335
  It should be noted, however, that it is unlikely 
that such proposals will be adopted given developed countries’ aggressive 
approach toward intellectual property rights enforcement and their 
dominance in the WTO and the ACTA. 
Second, given the widespread infringement of copyrights worldwide, 
and, according to some scholars, the emergence of a social norm against 
compliance with copyright law, educational campaigns should be an 
integral part of any initiative.  Indeed, Article 31 of the ACTA requires that 
each member state shall “as appropriate, promote the adoption of measures 
to enhance public awareness of the importance of respecting intellectual 
property rights and the detrimental effects of intellectual property rights 
infringement.”
336
  However, this Article is vague, unclear, and does not 
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specify what exactly can and should be done to achieve the goal of getting 
the public to respect intellectual property rights.  The ACTA should provide 
better clarity by providing a more comprehensive and clear program for an 
educational campaign.  In crafting such educational campaigns, the drafters 
of the ACTA should rely upon other experiences with educational 
campaigns.  It should be pointed out that in a recent report conducted by 
SSRC, Media Piracy in Emerging Economies, the authors conclude that 
copyright education campaigns are useless because consumers are not 
ignorant, but rather like their cheap copies: 
The consumer surplus generated by piracy is not just popular but also widely 
understood in economic-justice terms, mapped to perceptions of greedy U.S. and 
multinational corporations and to the broader structural inequalities of globalization in 
which most developing-world consumers live.  Enforcement efforts, in turn, are 
widely associated with U.S. pressure on national governments and are met with 
indifference or hostility by large majorities of respondents.
337
 
Thus, educational campaigns should also address and cope with people’s 
perceptions regarding copyright owners’ economic motives and deal with 
the injustice allegations commonly raised regarding copyright protection. 
Third, as the discussion above showed, one of the ACTA’s flaws is the 
lack of clarity regarding the required reforms.  The ACTA provides a 
general outline concerning criminal enforcement measures rather than 
specifically outlining what exact changes need to be made.  It will be better 
if the ACTA specifically outlines what changes are required so better 
harmonization is achieved as well as better and more effective results. 
Fourth, and lastly, it is critical, given the experience with 
implementing the TRIPS agreement, to consider the introduction of 
budgetary assistance programs by the developed world in order to make the 
implementation of the ACTA possible.  Enhanced criminal enforcement 
programs, as well as ACTA’s other measures, require resources.  Given the 
experience with the TRIPS agreement, whose implementation was 
postponed many times due to inability to have enforcement measures in 
place, it is very likely that developing and less-developed countries will 
need additional resources that they do not currently have to implement such 
advanced enforcement measures. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, from its beginnings, the ACTA has undergone many changes 
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that have silenced the loud outcries against it.  Despite these adjustments, 
the ACTA remains controversial, especially because it is viewed as a 
product of country-club politics.  This Article has focused on the ACTA’s 
criminal enforcement measures pertaining to copyright infringement.  
Descriptively, it provided a careful theoretical foundation for employing 
criminal law in the copyright law field, highlighting the complexities 
introduced by the intersection of criminal law and copyright law.  It has 
also provided a thorough analysis of the increasing criminalization of 
copyright law in the U.S. and provided existing data pertaining to its 
effects.  This analysis showed that the U.S. has not managed to successfully 
combat copyright piracy. 
Next, the Article moved on to explore the criminalization of copyright 
law internationally, discussing the changes that were introduced over time 
since the adoption of the Berne Convention and through the ACTA 
initiative.  The Article has shown how the TRIPS agreement has been 
highly criticized for being outdated given technological changes and that 
the China–U.S. dispute had served as a major trigger in considering a new 
enforcement scheme.  The Article has shown how the ACTA is modeled 
after the U.S. criminal enforcement scheme and how the U.S. experience is 
relevant to crafting any international enforcement scheme.  Normatively, 
the Article argues that the ACTA should be designed differently in light of 
the theoretical difficulties introduced and the U.S. experience in 
criminalizing copyright infringement.  The ACTA should focus more on 
clarity pertaining to the legislative fixes that should be adopted at the 
national level; rely on educational campaigns to enhance people’s 
understanding regarding copyright infringement; offer developing and less-
developed countries monetary assistance concerning enforcement; and 
consider lowering the minimum standards initially introduced into the 
TRIPS agreement in order to better reflect the new creative environment. 
Despite the strong criticisms of the ACTA, the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights is a major challenge to the developed world’s 
industries and governments.  There is no doubt that the TRIPS agreement 
enforcement measures need to be reconsidered given the technological 
changes we have witnessed since its adoption.  Therefore, the introduction 
of the ACTA is not surprising.  However, given what we know about 
criminal enforcement and its effects to date, policymakers should reconsider 
the wisdom of the ACTA in order to bring about a better framework that is 
actually responsive to the new creative environment. 
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